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In the year 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism completed its report 
concerning the status of US counter-terrorist efforts titled “Countering the Changing 
Threat of International Terrorism”. This report was congressionally mandated to evaluate 
“America’s laws, policies and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism directed at 
American citizens” (Countering the Changing Threat, p. 2). L. Paul Bremer, the chairman 
of the committee chose to begin his report with a passage written by Thomas C. Schelling 
in the forward to Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, by Roberta Wohlstetter. 
Schelling observed that; 
Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, 
diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also 
responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action 
gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a 
string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who 
need it.... It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those 
that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of…. It includes, in 
addition, the inability of individual human being to rise to the occasion 
until they are sure it is the occasion, which is usually too late. Finally, as at 
Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty 
introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck. (As cited in 
Countering the Changing Threat, p. 1) 
Tragically, on September 11, 2001, the United States was again surprised by an attack of 
such proportions as to evoke comparisons to Pearl Harbor. The very people discussed in 
Ambassador Bremer’s report had, again, attacked the United States. 
 A. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
Many have asked why nothing was done before September 11, 2001 to deal with 
the threat terrorists posed, or why past attempts to deter and defend against terrorists had 
evidently failed. The answers to these questions will be overshadowed by the more 
immediate question of what needs to be done in response to these latest attacks, and 
rightly so. But the original questions remain and, eventually, will be asked again. The 
United States has a long history of dealing with terrorism. The policies of the US 
government have changed and evolved with the threat itself. Most people can recall 
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incidents going back to the Iranian Hostage crisis in 1979-1980, which lasted 444 days, 
but few can recall what the official responses were to this and the many other occurrences 
of terrorism in the twenty years since the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Since the destruction of 
Pam Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the United States has primarily focused on 
finding people who have committed terrorist acts and bringing them to the US to stand 
trial for their crimes. Additionally, Congress has passed domestic laws against terrorist 
acts, and the executive branch has worked through the State Department to gain 
international support for conventions against terrorism. These efforts, but primarily the 
focus on prosecuting the people who carry out these attacks, constitute the law 
enforcement approach to combating terrorism. This approach is the subject of my 
analysis. My purpose is to determine if a law enforcement approach to combating 
terrorism, as executed by the United States from 1988 to 2001, met the needs of the US to 
properly respond to terrorist attacks directed against the US. 
B. DEFINING TERRORISM 
In order to facilitate any discussion of terrorism, it is first necessary to define the 
term. It seems that every author of an essay or book on terrorism feels the need to spend 
considerable space going over the various definitions and their relative merits. Suffice it 
to say that one of the problems inherent in a debate on the subject is the very definition of 
the term terrorism. In fact, fine variations in the specifics of the definition precipitated 
creation of the law enforcement approach evaluated in this effort. For purposes of 
brevity, and in order to focus on more pertinent issues, I will defer to the in-depth 
analysis of David Tucker in his book, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire (1997). Tucker 
devotes a whole chapter to comparing the relative merits of no less than seven definitions 
of the term used by various organizations of the US Government. The definition used in 
this research will be as follows; terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence 
against noncombatant targets by sub-national and or clandestine agents intended to 
influence an audience. Furthermore, this analysis is concerned only with acts of 
international terrorism directed against the US, as opposed to domestic terrorism such as 
the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.    
In addition to the debate about the definition of terrorism, another controversy, 
over the effectiveness of the law enforcement approach in combating it, has continued for 
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over fifty years. This continuing debate on how to deal with international terrorists is one 
with many facets and subplots. Each nation makes laws about domestic terrorism based 
on its own legal traditions. Problems arise when nations with differing legal traditions 
and histories try to reach a consensus on how to deal with terrorists who commit acts 
worldwide or from one nation to another. The differences between nations affect the 
ability of the community of nations to reach a consensus on how to define and react to 
international terrorism. Within the United States, elected officials and policy makers have 
trouble reaching a consensus on terrorist policy because of differences in their political 
orientation, religious beliefs, ethics and worldview. Other tactics utilized by the US in the 
past to deal with terrorists have included; making no concessions to their demands, 
diplomatic negotiations with terrorist groups or nations which support terrorists, 
economic sanctions against nations supporting terrorists, and military strikes against 
nations or the terrorists themselves. These approaches have succeeded or failed to 
varying degrees, but for the last thirteen years, the US government has primarily 
depended on the law enforcement method for dealing with terrorists.  
C. DEFINING A POLICY 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 might prompt one to hastily conclude 
that previous counter-terrorist strategies were not effective. Simply basing this judgment 
on one episode is not sufficient. In order to realistically evaluate US counter-terrorist 
strategy, we must look for patterns that existed prior to September 2001 and analyze them 
to gain insight into the effectiveness of the whole strategy. To begin with, what does the 
US need in a policy for combating terrorism? Put in the simplest terms possible, a policy 
for combating terrorism must effectively deter acts of terrorism against the US. Failing 
that, the policy must actively defend against terrorist attacks committed by those who 
cannot be deterred.  
The American Heritage Dictionary defines the word deter as “to prevent or 
discourage from acting, as by means of fear or doubt” (2000). A policy for combating 
terrorism must prevent terrorists from acting against the United States for fear of the 
consequences of that action. Denial based deterrence attempts to convince terrorists that 
they cannot accomplish their goals at an acceptable operational cost. Punishment-based 
deterrence seeks to inflict enough pain in response to an attack as to make it unattractive 
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as an option (Watman and Wilkening, 1995, p 16). The goal of deterrence is to modify 
their behavior, not necessarily their beliefs. 
Defend is defined as “to make or keep safe from danger, attack or harm” (AHD, 
2000). Defense can be active or passive. Active measures consist of identifying planned 
attacks before they occur and ensuring that they are not successful, thus keeping 
Americans safe from terrorism. This requires detailed intelligence and a proactive posture 
to deal decisively with impending attacks. An active defense is very different from a 
passive defense. Strictly speaking, passive defense is the hardening of potential terrorist 
targets so as to render the target impervious to attack. Passive measures could include 
military force protection, increased security at government buildings or background 
checks of employees and visitors to potential targets.  
D. CASE STUDIES 
This study will examine the US response to five large-scale, international terrorist 
attacks against Americans from 1988 to 2001: the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103, 
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, the 1996 
bombing of US Air Force barracks in Saudi Arabia, the near simultaneous bombings of 
two US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the 2000 bombing of the USS 
Cole in the Yemeni port of Oman. A survey of the statistics provided in the State 
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, for the years 1988-2000, reveals that these 
five attacks account for 76% of the total American fatalities and 86% of the American 
wounded in international terrorist attacks during the time period (Patterns of Global 
Terrorism, 1988-2000). The target of each attack (a US commercial airplane, the World 
Trade Center, a US military barracks overseas, US embassies and a US Navy warship) 
was a symbol of America, and therefore a target with symbolism above and beyond the 
people it contained. Each attack took place when the law enforcement approach was the 
predominant policy of the US against terrorism, and the responses to each attack were 
formulated using this approach. Chapter 2 will detail the history of the law enforcement 
approach, from the creation of the United Nations through the Reagan Administration 
and up to the destruction of Pan Am flight 103. Chapter 2 will also describe critical 
changes in the nature of international terrorism during that time. Chapters 3 through 7 
will examine each of the five international terrorist attacks listed above. Although the 
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1993 attack on the WTC might be considered a domestic terrorism case, it is included 
here because the State Department classifies international terrorism as “involving citizens 
or the territory of more than one country” (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001, p. vi). 
Chapter 8 will return to the basic premise that a policy must deter and defend against 
terrorism and use these measures of effectiveness as yardsticks to determine if the US 
response to these attacks, using the law enforcement approach, has been effective in 
combating terrorism.   
This analysis does not examine every terrorist incident that occurred during the 
selected time frame. As stated earlier, the purpose of this work is to examine America’s 
policy through its response to the most significant attacks that occurred while the law 
enforcement approach dominated. The reader might wonder why events such as the 
evident thwarting of attacks planned to coincide with the millennium celebrations at the 
end of 1999 are not examined as part of this study. While the capture of Ahmed Ressam 
at the Canadian border near Seattle was definitely critical from the standpoint of stopping 
a potential terrorist attack, the heightened security surrounding this relatively short period 
of time must be considered an anomaly. The fact that this increased security posture was 
only implemented for the impending celebrations keeps this case from representing the 
“norm” with respect to counter-terrorist strategy during this period. 
E. WHY EXAMINE RESPONSES TO TERRORIST ATTACKS? 
It can be argued that, because of the political limitations associated with policy 
decisions in the US government, the most permissive time to effect US counter-terrorist 
strategy is in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Every time international terrorists attack 
Americans, a window of opportunity opens during which the President has behind him 
the moral support of the US population. The more significant the attack, the larger the 
window opens. This window of opportunity begins to close almost immediately. As time 
passes, the response options open to the government become fewer and fewer. Therefore, 
the point in time when the president has the least support for affecting US counter-
terrorist policy is just before an attack, when the last attack is the most distant in public 
memory. However, once an attack has occurred, the President may take the most 
significant steps to either reinforce existing policy, or establish new policy. Furthermore, 
once changes have been made, they become institutionalized and may be repeated easier 
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in the future. It is for this reason that this study will focus on how the US chose to 
respond to these five terrorist attacks.  
F. WHY THIS STUDY IS IMPORTANT 
This examination, of what might be considered an out of date policy, is important 
for a couple of reasons. The United States has lost too many people to terrorism and, 
despite having more counter-terrorist capabilities than most nations; the priority for 
terrorism has been consistently placed below other problems in the past. After the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, indications are, that the focus of US policy will 
no longer rely solely on the law enforcement method. As the memories of September 11 
fade, arguments for a return to strictly law enforcement approaches to combating 
terrorism will gain acceptance. A thorough understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the law enforcement approach will allow policy makers to compare it to 
responses during the post- September 11 period and, potentially, to make better decisions 
about how to best shape our policy in the future. 















II. HISTORY OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The law enforcement approach, as implemented by the United States Government 
between 1988 and 2000, did not spring complete from the mind of a single person. Its 
development was a result of many years of attempts by the US and the international 
community to define and respond to terrorism. Additionally, in the late 1980’s several 
non-related events created circumstances that pushed the law enforcement approach from 
being one of many options to the primary option of the US Government. This chapter will 
outline the history of US and international attempts to define and regulate international 
terrorism and trace the development of the law enforcement approach to combating 
terrorism, as exercised by the US Government.      
B. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE TERRORISM 
In the decades after World War One, the establishment of the League of Nations 
created the first international body to address terrorism in modern times. After a sharp 
increase in terrorism in the post-war years, the assassination of King Alexander of 
Yugoslavia in France in 1934 finally pushed the League of Nations to action. The 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, completed in 1937, defined 
terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a state and intended to create terror in the 
minds of a particular person, or a group of persons or the general public” (Moore & 
Turner, 1990, p. 447). This very broad definition made the convention both a help and 
potential hindrance to many nations and, therefore, only one member of the League of 
Nations ratified the convention.  
Almost twenty years later, in 1954, the United Nations also tried to write 
legislation that would outlaw terrorism. That year, the International Law Commission 
drafted the Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The draft Code, 
again, broadly defined terrorism, this time as “the undertaking or encouragement by the 
authorities of a State of terrorist activity in another State, or the toleration by the 
authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in 
another State” (Moore & Turner, 1990, p. 447). The draft Code also made these acts an 
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offense against mankind and a crime under international law. As with the convention of 
1937, the 1954 document has never been adopted by the UN because of the inability of 
member nations to agree to this definition of terrorism.  
As the failure of these early documents demonstrates, a consensus on defining 
international terrorism and successfully legislating against it has been, at best, a nearly 
impossible goal to achieve. In his book on national security law, John Murphy discusses 
these early attempts to define and outlaw “terrorism” in its entirety. He correctly 
identifies the logical next step taken by the UN and other multi-national bodies, noting 
that “because of its inability to agree on a definition of international terrorism, the world 
community has attempted to resolve the problem of definition by ignoring it and focusing 
instead on identifying particular criminal acts to be prevented and punished” (Moore & 
Turner, 1990, p. 447). Identifying and outlawing particular acts of terrorism, while 
satisfying the particular desires of affected nations, was piecemeal in its approach and 
required constant refining with new legislation. The result was that, at least initially, there 
was no international treaty that specifically addressed a creative new form of terrorism 
when it appeared. Admittedly, while this situation was not ideal, it did give the UN and 
other multi-national organizations a way to actually agree on and pass treaties responding 
to terrorism.    
C. GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
The best examples of this treaty-based approach are twelve international 
agreements formulated under the United Nations. Beginning in 1963, and continuing to 
the current year (2002), the United Nations has written and ratified a total of twelve 
international treaties dealing with specific acts of international terrorism. Because of the 
problems identified by Professor Murphy, each treaty is very limited in its scope, only 
identifies certain acts as terrorism, and avoids any general definition of terrorism. A 
student of terrorism, especially terrorism directed against the United States, would 
quickly recognize a pattern linking the topic of a particular treaty to the most prevalent 
form of terrorism at the time the treaty was written. For example, three treaties dealing 
with civil aviation safety and hijacking of aircraft, signed in 1963, 1970, and 1988 
respectively, coincide with the earliest attempt at aircraft hijacking (1963) and two later 
periods (late 1960s and mid-1980s) that saw a resurgence in its use by terrorists. Another 
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example is the 1988 treaty dealing with maritime hijacking written shortly after the 
October 1985 takeover of the cruise ship, Achille Lauro.   
D. EARLY US RESPONSES 
The first efforts by the US government to create organizations within the federal 
government to deal with terrorist incidents and formulate policy came in the early 1970s. 
These efforts began in the aftermath of the 1972 massacre of Israeli athletes at the 
Munich Olympics. Successive US Presidents reorganized and renamed committees and 
slowly built up a body of policies, which can collectively be called the principles of US 
counter-terrorist strategy.    
1. President Nixon 
President Nixon responded to the Munich massacre by ordering, first, the creation 
of an intelligence committee and, later, a Cabinet-level committee concerned with 
combating terrorism. The head of the committee’s working group was named the Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Combating Terrorism. His job was to work with the 
committee to coordinate counter-terrorist efforts, evaluate counter-terrorist programs and 
make recommendations for the funding of these efforts. One significant policy that 
resulted from the efforts of this committee was the decision that the United States would 
make no concessions to terrorist’s demands. This policy was first made public in 1973, 
after the kidnapping of several Americans by the Black September organization. When 
President Nixon stated publicly that terrorists would not blackmail the US, the Black 
September Organization killed the Americans. Despite this outcome, the US stuck by its 
decision and “no concessions” became a standard part of US counter-terrorism policy. 
The second significant policy that grew out of the Nixon Administration was the decision 
to support the international conventions against terrorist acts mentioned earlier.  
The great majority of terrorist incidents against Americans during the early 1970s 
consisted of kidnapping or taking hostage individuals or small groups of Americans. The 
US response consisted of working through the host government to resolve the issue, 
sometimes successfully. By the end of the Nixon years, the US had the beginnings of a 
strategy for dealing with international terrorism. The US, at this point, viewed terrorists 
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as criminals, would make no concessions to their demands, and supported international 
conventions against certain terrorist acts.    
2. President Carter 
When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1976, he dissolved the Cabinet 
Committee and transferred its responsibilities to the National Security Council. He also 
designated, for the first time, “lead agencies” to handle terrorist incidents. These included 
the State Department for overseas incidents and the Justice Department for domestic 
incidents, with the Federal Aviation Administration taking over in the event of a domestic 
aircraft hijacking. The designation of lead agencies meant that, while they would handle 
actual incidents, the NSC (and its various sub-committees) would handle policy 
decisions. Later, during the Reagan Administration, changes in the law would result in 
the FBI becoming the de-facto lead agency in many overseas terrorist incidents. The later 
part of the 1970s saw a rise in incidents of state-sponsored terrorism. State–sponsored 
terrorism is the employment of free-lance terrorist groups by governments to accomplish 
political ends. Usually, the terrorist groups and the governments who supported them had 
some philosophical or ideological connection, such as support for the PLO or 
socialism/communism. Viewed through this lens, President Carter and his policymakers 
saw terrorism as, primarily, a political and diplomatic issue for the US. Evidence of this 
belief is found in the economic sanctions imposed on Libya by the US in 1978 and 1979, 
as a result of Libya’s support of terrorists.    
In November 1979, the US encountered the first large-scale act of international 
terrorism directed solely against it in the modern era. The taking of 53 Americans hostage 
by Iranian students in 1979 was done with the tacit approval, if not outright support, of 
the Iranian Revolutionary government of the Ayatollah Khomeni. In keeping with its 
previous belief that terrorism was a political and diplomatic challenge, the Carter 
Administration tried to deal with Iran through negotiation, sanctions, and, finally, 
military action. Preoccupation with this matter distracted both the president and the 
American public, and led to Jimmy Carter’s loss in the 1980 presidential election. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, although the beginnings of a law-enforcement apparatus were 
now in place to deal with terrorism and the US had identified terrorists as criminals, the 
US Government had not tried to use law enforcement as a means to deal with terrorists. 
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3. President Reagan  
After the return of the hostages and the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s 
administration, incidents of terrorism directed against the US did not abate and the new 
administration took steps to meet the emerging threat to US interests abroad. Initially, 
after the release of US hostages from Iran, the Reagan Administration responded with 
new background legislation. This included the 1982 refinement of Lead Federal Agency 
responsibility in handling terrorist incidents, both at home and abroad, and the 1983 
establishment of the Antiterrorist Assistance Program that provided for training of other 
nations to deal with terrorist groups in their own countries (Public Report of the Vice 
President, 1986, p. 730). The goal of the Reagan Administration was to correct some of 
the problems encountered during the Carter years and set the stage for quicker military 
responses to hostage incidents. The terrorists, however, did not cooperate. In late 1983, 
they bombed both the US Embassy and the Marine Barracks in Beirut, killing scores of 
Americans, leaving no hostages to be rescued, and forcing the US to leave Beirut.  
In April 1984, President Reagan authorized four bills to counter what he saw as a 
growing trend of state-sponsored terrorism. These included two pieces of enabling 
legislation for standing international conventions that had already been ratified by the US 
(Taking of Hostages and Aircraft Sabotage), a bill authorizing rewards for information on 
wanted terrorists and a bill outlawing support of terrorist organizations. At the time of 
their introduction to Congress, Reagan noted that they would “enhance the ability of the 
Department of Justice to prosecute persons involved in the support of terrorist activities 
and of states using terrorism” [emphasis added](Reagan, 1984). Most significantly, the 
1984 Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Hostage Taking, which was meant as 
enabling legislation for an international convention, actually made it a crime to take an 
American hostage anywhere in the world. This law, as well as the 1986 Omnibus Anti-
Terrorism Act, substantially expanded the powers of the FBI to investigate and arrest 
people who took Americans hostage overseas. This new authority for the FBI would have 
significant implications for US counter-terrorist policy in years to come.  
The year 1985 saw terrorists strike again. This time US hostages were taken, 
however, in both the hijacking of TWA flight 847 and the hijacking of the cruise ship, 
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Achille Lauro, no terrorists were captured. Then-Vice President George Bush chaired a 
task force on combating terrorism created by President Reagan in the aftermath of these 
two incidents. The report of that task force, released in 1986, states that;  
The US considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a 
potential threat to national security….The United States will take 
measures to protect its citizens, property and interests…will act in a strong 
manner against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or 
endangering democratic principles. (Public Report of the Vice President, 
1986, p. 729)  
In this report, the only mention of a law enforcement approach in bringing 
terrorists to justice is at the end of a list of methods that includes, most predominantly, a 
discussion of military force options. Interestingly, two of the recommendations of the 
Task Force are; a further study of the relationship between terrorism and domestic and 
international legal systems, and the need for laws making terrorist acts (including 
murder) federal crimes. The Task Force report reinforces the notion that the Reagan 
Administration saw the use of force, especially the military, as the primary response to 
terrorist incidents. Seeking diplomatic and legal solutions was low on their list of options 
(Public Report of the Vice President, 1986, p. 719-748). 
The most spectacular response to a terrorist incident by the Reagan 
Administration was Operation Eldorado Canyon, the April 15, 1986 bombing of Libya. 
The incident that precipitated the US attack was the April 5, 1986 bombing of a nightclub 
in Germany that was popular with US service personnel. In the aftermath of the nightclub 
attack, President Reagan signed three executive orders prohibiting US interaction with 
Libya. These included one prohibiting the import of goods or services, one prohibiting 
the import of petroleum products, and one blocking Libyan property and interests in the 
US. Interestingly, these three documents constitute 75% of the executive orders dealing 
with terrorism signed by President Reagan during his eight years in office (International 





E. CONDITIONS FOR ASCENDANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
METHOD 
At the beginning of this chapter it was noted that, in addition to the history of the 
law enforcement approach to combating terrorism, there was a confluence of events at the 
end of the 1980s that led to the adoption of the law enforcement approach as the primary 
method of countering international terrorism directed against the United States. These 
events were the Iran-Contra scandal, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the bombing of Pan 
Am flight 103. Each of these events set conditions, which together resulted in the 
ascendance of the law enforcement method as primary in US policy. 
1. Iran-Contra 
The Iran Contra scandal, first made public by a November 1986 article in a 
Lebanese magazine, had profound effects on US counter-terrorism strategy. Most 
importantly, it showed the world that the US would negotiate with terrorists in direct 
contradiction with its stated “no concessions” policy. In order to restore international and 
domestic confidence in its counter-terrorism policy, the Reagan Administration began to 
emphasis the law enforcement approach. The use of laws and courts was seen as ideal 
because of the judiciary’s untarnished image and respected position in society. Second, 
since one of the prime players in the scandal, Oliver North, was the National Security 
Council’s representative to the Reagan Administration’s Standing Interagency Group 
(SIG) for Terrorism, suspicion was cast on the whole Interagency Group. When lawyers 
for the Justice Department began sitting in on SIG meetings and leaks to the press began, 
some of the operational agencies involved in the SIG, such as the CIA and FBI, began to 
reduce cooperation for fear of security breaches. This diminished the effectiveness of the 
SIG and forced the Administration to look for other ways to execute its counter-terrorism 
strategy.  
2. Fall of the Soviet Union 
The end of the 1980s saw the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold 
War. These events caused major shifts in US national security strategy. The effect on US 
counter-terrorism strategy was also significant. The collapse of the USSR and Russia’s 
ensuing domestic problems ended what had been major support of terrorist efforts against 
the United States. Formerly, the USSR had sponsored terrorist groups operating against 
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the US, such as the Baader-Meinhof gang and Red Army Faction in Germany and the 
Red Brigades in Italy. Documents of the Soviet’s Central Committee, released by 
President Yeltsin of Russia in 1992, proved the existence of this support (Tucker, 1997, 
p. 25). The USSR also supported client states that sponsored terrorist groups against the 
US, such as Libyan and Syrian support of the PLO, the PFLP and the Abu Nidal 
Organization. With Soviet support gone, the actions of these and other terrorist groups 
against the US were no longer seen in the light of threats to US national security. This 
shift in the minds of US policy makers helped to make the law enforcement approach, 
with its long-term approach and familiarity to the public, more attractive as a means to 
combat terrorism. It would not be until the rise of the possibility of use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) that the idea of terrorism as a threat to national security would 
gain acceptance. 
3. The Bombing of Pan Am 103 
The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 will be covered in detail as the first case study 
of this work. However, it bears mentioning here for its role in the ascendance of the law 
enforcement approach to combating terrorism in the 1990’s. After the bombing, when no 
terrorist group claimed responsibility, the US and Great Britain began an intensive 
investigation to determine who was responsible. Since the FBI, with its enormous 
forensic capability, was the logical choice for such an investigation and since the FBI is a 
law-enforcement agency of the US government, the resulting body of evidence was, not 
surprisingly, sufficient for a criminal trial. This fact, when combined with other factors 
that will be covered in detail in the next chapter, resulted in the decision to pursue a 
criminal trial rather than a diplomatic or military response to the bombing.  
F. CHANGES IN TERRORISM 
One final dimension relevant to any discussion of the history of US counter-
terrorism policy is the changing nature of terrorism itself during this time period. In the 
book Inside Terrorism (1998), Bruce Hoffman, head of the RAND Corporation’s 
terrorism research unit, identifies four areas in which terrorism in the late 1980s and 
1990s differed from terrorism previously. He uses as his example the bombing of the two 
US embassies in Africa in 1998, but the trends he illustrates are relevant to the entire time 
period studied in this research. First, there has been no effort to limit casualties. Where as 
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previously, terrorist groups generally followed the creed “terrorists want a lot of people 
watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead”, now the emphasis 
shifted to massive, indiscriminate casualties (Brian Jenkins, as quoted in Hoffman, 1998, 
p. 198). Second, terrorists expanded their operations to parts of the world not previously 
used. Whereas previously terrorists had attacked Americans primarily in Europe or the 
Middle East, the 1990’s saw attacks, by international terrorists, in the United States and 
Africa. Third, the attacks were undertaken by previously unknown, or unacknowledged 
groups. The men who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 were a loosely affiliated 
group that had never worked together before. Also, al-Qaeda did not have an established 
record of attacking Americans prior to the 1998 bombing of the embassies in Africa. 
Finally, there were no immediate claims of responsibility by the terrorists who carried out 
the attacks. In the 1980s, the trend was very different, with groups rushing to claim 
responsibility in order to capitalize on the psychological effects of an attack. The 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 had no such claim, one of the reasons for the enormous 
investigation by the US and Great Britain. 
These changes in the nature of the attacks resulted in significantly different 
statistics with respect to terrorism in the 1990s. The most telling statistic is the drop in the 
actual number of attacks, with a corresponding rise in their lethality. In Inside Terrorism, 
Hoffman notes that in the 1970s, only 17% of international terrorist attacks killed anyone. 
In the 1980s that number rose slightly to 19%, but in the 1990s it jumped to 29%. This 
statistic is best explained by the corresponding desire to maximize casualties by the 
terrorists. Another disturbing trend in terrorism in the 1990s has been an increase in 
attempts to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The use of Sarin gas by the 
Aum Shinrikyo religious cult in a Tokyo subway, in 1995, was the first successful use of 
a nerve agent by a terrorist group. As noted earlier, the collapse of the USSR had 
significant effects on US counter-terrorism policy; it also made many of the raw materials 
necessary for WMD more readily available to terrorists. These two developments would 
again put terrorism in the light of a threat to national security.  
G. SUMMARY 
By the end of the 1980s, the law enforcement approach to combating terrorism 
took the form it would hold through the 1990s and into the year 2000. The policy focused 
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on investigating terrorist attacks against the United States as criminal acts, pursuing the 
people who committed these acts of terrorism, apprehending them and returning them to 
the US for a criminal trial. The Iran-Contra scandal, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 set the stage for the law enforcement approach to become 
the focus for US counter-terrorist policy during the ensuing decade. Important changes in 
terrorism itself would influence the effectiveness of this policy, as would the personal 
influences of policy makers within the US government during the 1990s.  
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III. PAN AM FLIGHT 103 
The first terrorist attack that occurred in the aftermath of Iran-Contra and the end 
of the Cold War happened as President Ronald Reagan prepared to step down after eight 
years in office. His successor, George H. W. Bush, was expected by many to perpetuate 
most of the policies of the Reagan Administration. The attack on a US commercial 
airplane stunned the world and forced the new President to establish his counter-terrorist 
policy much quicker than expected. The circumstances of the bombing allowed for an 
investigative approach not used before and presented the law enforcement agencies of the 
US government, notably the FBI, with a new opportunity. The bombing of Pan Am flight 
103 set many of the policies that would survive into the 1990’s with respect to combating 
terrorism.  
A. THE ATTACK 
The bombing of Flight 103 occurred on the evening of December 21, 1988. The 
bomb, investigators later determined, consisted of a small quantity of Semtex explosive 
rigged inside a Toshiba radio cassette recorder, packed inside a regular suitcase. The 
flight, which originated in Frankfurt, Germany, had landed in London’s Heathrow 
Airport and then taken off again at 6:25 PM, bound for New York’s JFK Airport. At 7:15 
PM, as it climbed to 31,000 feet over the Scottish countryside, the bomb detonated. The 
explosion occurred in the forward baggage compartment, just forward of the wings. It 
tore through the fuselage and probably weakened the structure sufficiently to allow the 
cockpit and first class portion of the plane to tear away. The explosion also occurred next 
to the main electronic panels, which means that Pan Am 103 lost all communications and 
flight controls immediately. The plane, no doubt, disintegrated further as the forces of 
forward momentum and depressurization took effect, with pieces impacting in and 
around the town of Lockerbie. All 259 people aboard the flight were killed along with 
eleven residents of Lockerbie on the ground; 189 of these people were Americans. 
Because the explosion occurred at such a high altitude, the debris was scattered over an 
845 square-mile area.  
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B. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE  
1. The FBI 
The first US investigator to respond to the news of the downed airplane was FBI 
Special Agent Tim Dorch. He worked in the Legal Attaché’s (LEGAT) office of the US 
Embassy in London. Ambassador Charles Prince and Tim Dorch, along with embassy 
security personnel, were in Lockerbie “within hours of the crash” (Emerson & Duffy, 
1990, p. 26). The news also reached FBI headquarters soon after the crash and agents 
were put on alert for deployment to Lockerbie. During the night of December 21 almost 
500 police and military personnel, mostly from areas around Dumfries District, arrived at 
the town. They came to look for survivors, fight fires, provide medical assistance and 
begin the grim work of figuring out what happened to cause the large jet to crash into this 
small Scottish town. The man in charge of the whole operation was John Boyd. At the 
time of the crash he was the chief constable for the Dumfries District. Boyd ordered the 
police agencies arriving on the scene to set up shop in the Lockerbie Academy. Tim 
Dorch took over one of the Academy’s chemistry labs for the FBI and immediately 
established secure communications with the LEGAT office in London and FBI 
Headquarters in Washington DC. The Embassy officials accompanying Ambassador 
Prince set up in another classroom nearby. 
The first meeting of all the investigators took place the following morning. John 
Boyd introduced all of the agencies represented there. The FBI took its place in the 
meeting and would be part of this investigation until the very end. That same day the first 
group of FBI agents from the US arrived. Among them were members of the Ident Team, 
a select group of agents who specialize in fingerprinting corpses and live people. They 
would help to identify the bodies of the victims so that the remains could be returned to 
waiting families. Soon after this first group, more agents, this time from the Criminal 
Investigation Division, as well as explosives experts from the FBI, arrived to assist the 
investigators already on the ground. In all, by the morning of December 22, 1100 police 
officers and 600 soldiers were in and around Lockerbie to help with the search for bodies 
and clues as to why this plane crashed (Emerson & Duffy, 1990, p. 42).  
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By December 25 the searchers had conclusive proof that a bomb was responsible 
for the crash. The FBI did not want to release that information, fearing that it would alert 
those responsible and allow them a head start from the law (Emerson & Duffy, 1990, p. 
98). The information got to the press anyway and by the next morning was public 
knowledge. FBI Executive Assistant Director for Investigations, Buck Revell, decided 
that there were approximately 1200 suspects that would have to be questioned, including 
the families of all the passengers, the ground crews at all the airports involved in Flight 
103’s route, and all of the security personnel at those same airports. He therefore 
concluded that the investigation would require agents from all of the FBI’s fifty-nine 
field offices. In their book about the crash, Emerson and Duffy note that Buck Revell felt 
“the right tone be set from the onset” for this investigation, adding that the FBI just 
assumed that it would be the lead US agency for the investigation (1990, p. 70). The day 
after Christmas the National Security Agency began reviewing its intercepts to try and 
find some pattern or clue as to the identity or methods of the attackers. 
On December 28 the FBI’s Director, William Sessions, held a news conference. 
He noted publicly that the FBI was authorized to participate in the investigation under 
Title 18, US Code 32, which involves the “interference with or destruction of United 
States aircraft traveling in foreign or interstate commerce” (Emerson & Duffy, 1990, p. 
143). Sessions also added that the FBI had no reason to suspect terrorism stating, “we 
have no suspicions that [the incident was] criminal or that it [was] terroristic” (Emerson 
& Duffy, 1990, p. 143). This statement contrasts directly with Emerson’s assertion that 
knowledge of a bomb (which implies a criminal act) existed three days prior to this news 
conference.  
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During what normally would have been a quiet time for the holidays, Director 
Sessions created an FBI task force for the Pan Am 103 bombing and named it 
“Scotbom”. More importantly, two additional groups of FBI agents were assigned to the 
task force. The first, a small group of agents known as C-3, had a normal compliment of 
seven agents who were experts at conducting overseas arrests and apprehensions of 
suspected criminals. Their past accomplishments included a joint operation with the DEA 
and CIA, leading to the arrest of Fawaz Younis, a known hijacker, on a yacht off of 
Cyprus, and the arrest of Mohammed Ali Hamadei. Hamadei, one of the men who 
hijacked TWA flight 847 in 1985 and held the plane in Beruit, was believed to be 
responsible for the murder of US Navy diver Robert Stethem during that hijacking. The 
second group of agents assigned to “Scotbom” was from the FBI’s International 
Response Team. These agents are fluent in foreign languages and useful to any 
investigations conducted in foreign countries (Emerson & Duffy, 1990, p. 149). The 
commitment of these two groups clearly indicates that the FBI planned to conduct 
extensive investigations overseas as part of the Scotbom investigation.  
2. Other Governmental Agencies 
The FBI was not the only federal agency to get involved in the bombing. Within 
weeks of the crash both the CIA and the DIA were working to provide clues as to who 
was responsible. In their book on Pan Am flight 103, Emerson and Duffy recount how 
the CIA was very quick to send people to the crash site. They claim, however, that the 
reason for the CIA’s speedy dispatch, “within hours of the crash”, was to recover 
sensitive documents that the CIA believed to be on the plane (1990, p. 41). The CIA also 
fanned out across the globe and contacted sources in thirty countries, both in and out of 
government, to try and obtain leads. The DIA focused on Middle Eastern terrorist groups, 
as evidenced by the detention of two US Army officers by the Syrian government after 
they took photos of a training camp for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GC) in Syria, on March 3, 1989. Although both men, COL 
Clifford Ward and MAJ Robert Siegel, were defense attaches with the US Embassy, the 
photos upset the Syrian government because they believed that Israeli intelligence would 
use the photos to plan an attack on the camp. 
In May 1989, senior officials from the investigative agencies involved held their 
third meeting in Washington DC to discuss the progress of the investigation. Lawyers 
from the Department of Justice were tasked to determine if there was sufficient evidence 
to take the matter to a grand jury. Upon review of the evidence the Justice Department 
determined that the Scottish rules of evidence were strict enough to pass US standards; in 





3. Theories of Responsibility 
At the time of this meeting, five months into the investigation, agents had 
followed leads in such diverse countries as Germany, England, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Czechoslovakia, Malta, and Senegal, using two theories about how the bomb got onto the 
plane and where the bomb came from. The evidence seemed to point to Frankfurt 
Germany as the place where the bomb was loaded onto the flight, and there were two 
probable explanations for who was responsible.  
The first was a PFLP-GC bomb maker named Marwan Kreeshat, who was known 
in the Middle East as a highly proficient bomb maker. He was arrested along with 16 
other suspected terrorists and then mysteriously released by German authorities in late 
October 1988. He immediately disappeared. In the apartment where he was apprehended, 
police found a Toshiba radio that expertly concealed a cleverly built bomb.  He was 
believed to be working at the behest of the Iranian government, which wanted revenge 
for the destruction of an Iranian passenger plane by the USS Vincennes in 1988. 
The second theory pointed to Libyan intelligence operatives working at the 
direction of Muammar Qadhafi. These agents, working undercover as employees of 
Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), sent the suitcase containing the bomb as unaccompanied 
baggage on Air Malta Flight 180 to Frankfurt, using stolen luggage tags. In Frankfurt, the 
suitcase was transferred to Pan Am flight 103, bound for London and New York. Qadhafi 
wanted to destroy an American plane in retaliation for the 1986 bombing of Tripoli by 
the US. Although the lawyers at the May 1989 meeting were pleased with the standards 
of evidence being used by the Scottish investigators, they decided that neither theory was 
strong enough to stand up in court and so the investigation continued.  
C. THE LONG TERM RESPONSE 
After the initial investigation established that a bomb, placed on the flight in 
Frankfurt, was responsible for the loss of Pan Am 103, the next focus for investigators 
was to determine which theory had the most convincing legal evidence, gather that 
evidence, and build a solid case to bring to trial. Ultimately, investigators found that they 
had the most compelling evidence for the Libyan connection, however the coincidences 
with the Iranians and the PFLP-GC were hard to ignore.  
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1. The PFLP-GC and the Iranians  
What American and Scottish authorities did not know as they met in May 1989 
was that the Germans had more evidence than they were sharing about the potential 
origin of the bomb that brought down Flight 103. Since the beginning of the 
investigation, US and Scottish investigators had been frustrated by the lack of 
cooperation they had received from the German government (Emerson & Duffy, 1990, 
p.137). The Germans seemed to resent the implication that the bomb had been placed on 
Pan Am 103 at its origin in Frankfurt Germany.  
The Germans called the operation that had netted Marwan Kreeshat in October 
1988 “Autumn Leaves.” After careful surveillance, the German internal security service, 
the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), arrested 17 suspected members of the PFLP-GC. All but 
a handful were immediately released due to insufficient evidence. The Toshiba radio the 
BKA took as evidence during the raid was not discovered to be a bomb until three days 
later. By all accounts, after some impressive surveillance work, the arrest phase of the 
operation was poorly executed. Buck Revell learned of the operation during his initial 
visit to Germany after the bombing (Emerson & Duffy, 1990, p. 168). Thereafter, 
requests for more information concerning that operation by Scotbom investigators were 
met with little cooperation. In April 1989, by an amazing piece of luck, BKA 
investigators located three more of the five bombs Marwan Kreeshat boasted to have 
built in the same apartment where they arrested him five months earlier. Both the FBI and 
Scottish investigators theorized that the fifth bomb, which was never located, might have 
been placed aboard Pan Am flight 103. The question remaining was, who put that bomb 
on the flight?  
The potential answer to that question came in August 1989 when investigators in 
Lockerbie found scraps of clothing, apparently from Malta, that had been in the suitcase 
with the bomb. After careful inquiries by investigators it was determined that Abu Talb, 
an Egyptian terrorist living in Sweden, had purchased the clothes in Malta, during a trip 
in October 1988. Abu Talb had a definite connection to the PFLP-GC people arrested as 
part of Autumn Leaves. He had also circled the date of the bombing, December 21, on a 
calendar found in his house. So it appeared that the bomber had been located. 
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Unfortunately for the Scotbom investigators, Abu Talb was already being tried by 
Swedish authorities for two bombings in Copenhagen and Stockholm and was not 
available for extradition. 
2. The Libyan Connection 
The theory about Libyan involvement bore many coincidences to the PFLP-GC 
theory. The following account was obtained from the testimony of G. Henry Schuler 
before a sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1994 (US 
Policy, 1994, p. 79-80).  
In February 1988 authorities in Senegal detained two Libyan men. A search of 
their possessions revealed electronic equipment, including timers, which later proved to 
match exactly pieces found at the crash site in Lockerbie. The critical piece, found at the 
crash site, was a small circuit board from a timer which was subsequently traced to a 
Swiss electronic manufacturer, Meister et Bollier. When US investigators asked the 
Swiss firm about the timers, it confirmed that twenty of the prototype electronic times 
had been constructed for a Libyan man who picked them up in 1985. The Libyan’s name 
was Said Rashid and his assistant at his Zurich office was Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi, 
one of the men later indicted by the US Attorney.  
Investigators also learned that Al-Megrahi spent the night of December 7, 1988 at 
a hotel in Malta, where he registered as a dispatcher for LAA. Inquiries at the clothing 
store, Mary’s House, revealed that Al-Megrahi bought a batch of miscellaneous clothing 
there that day and left town the next. This is the same store where Abu Talb is also 
thought to have purchased clothes. Investigators in Malta also learned that Al-Megrahi 
and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, a former manager for LAA’s Malta office, arrived there 
from Tripoli on December 20, 1988 with brown, Samsonite suitcases resembling the one 
found in the Pan Am debris.  
One of the unanswered questions from the investigation into how the suitcase got 
onto flight 103 in Frankfurt was a piece of unaccompanied baggage that transferred from 
Air Malta flight 180 to Pan Am 103. A check of the records from Luqa Airport in Malta 
revealed that the bags from Air Malta 180 were handled at the same counter as a Libyan 
Arab Airlines flight, 147. The manager of the Malta office for LAA provided the final 
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piece of the puzzle. Abdel Majid Giaka confirmed that Al-Megrahi boarded LAA flight 
147, bound for Tripoli, the morning of 21 December. He also confirmed that Fhimah, 
using his knowledge of the LAA operation in Malta, obtained Air Malta luggage tags, 
apparently to put on the luggage that Al-Megrahi checked at the counter. With Air Malta 
tags, the bag Al-Megrahi check could have easily been headed to Frankfurt and Pan Am 
flight 103. A final loose end, the acquisition of Semtex explosives for the bomb, was tied 
up when the Czech government confirmed that Libya purchased large quantities of the 
explosive during the communist era. This also helped to confirm greater Libyan 
government involvement in the plot. 
  3. The Indictments 
By November 1990, investigators had interviewed over 14,000 people in 50 
countries (Mickolus, 1993, p. 281). They had also reconstructed 85% of the plane in their 
effort to gain clues as to the identity of the terrorists. At least five theories as to how the 
bomb got on the plane had been extensively investigated. On November 21, 1990 the 
Washington Post ran an article alleging that the bomb was constructed by the PFLP-GC 
and paid for by Iran to be used in retaliation for the destruction of an Iranian Airbus by 
the USS Vincennes. The article claimed that the PFLP-GC refused to continue after the 
Autumn Leaves arrests and that Libyan agents carried out the attack instead (Mickolus, 
1993, p. 281). This hybrid theory is the first time that a public mention of Libyan 
involvement in the bombing was made. On June 26, 1991 French officials investigating 
the 1989 bombing of a UTA flight announced that they had evidence that Libyan 
intelligence operatives were involved in both the UTA and Pan Am bombings. Finally, in 
Washington DC, a Federal grand jury announced on November 14, 1991 that it had 
indicted “two Libyan intelligence officers” on 193 felony counts. These included 189 
counts of murder, “one count of conspiracy, one count of putting a destructive device on 
a US civil aircraft resulting in death, one count of destroying a US civil aircraft with an 
explosive device, and one count of destroying a vehicle in foreign commerce” (Mickolus, 
1993, p. 282).  
4. Libya’s Response 
Not surprisingly, Libya denied the allegations. Despite pressure from both the 
United States and United Kingdom, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi refused to hand 
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over Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah because Libya did not 
have an extradition treaty with either country. Both the US and UK would not accept that 
the two men had acted alone. Marlin Fitzwater, President Bush’s press secretary at the 
time, claimed that, “it’s impossible for us to believe that the government [of Libya] was 
not involved and that this is not a case of state-sponsored terrorism” (Mickolus, 1993, p. 
283). Qadhafi handed the matter to his own justice department to evaluate on November 
23, 1991 and four days later the US and UK again called for the two suspects to be 
released and for the government of Libya to “accept official responsibility for their 
actions, pay compensation and furnish witnesses and evidence for prosecuting the case” 
(Mickolus, 1993, p. 284).  
The US then turned to the United Nations for help in obtaining the two men. On 
January 21, 1992 the UN adopted Resolution 731. In the Resolution, the Security Counsel 
noted that it was “deeply concerned over the results of investigations, which implicate 
officials of the Libyan Government”. The resolution went on to “condemn the destruction 
of Pan Am flight 103...and the resultant loss of hundreds of lives” and “urge the Libyan 
Government immediately to provide a full and effective response”, but did not impose 
any punishment for failing to provide the support. Qadhafi ignored the Resolution, so the 
UK and US pushed for more substantial measures, which they got just two months later. 
On March 31, 1992 the UN Security Counsel adopted Resolution 748. This resolution 
imposed sanctions on Libya that were to remain in effect until that country handed over 
the suspects and committed “itself definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all 
assistance to terrorist groups” (UN Resolution 748, para 2). The resolution gave Libya 
only two weeks to comply or have the sanctions imposed. Qadhafi ignored the demand. 
Meanwhile, Libya took the matter to the International Court of Justice where it 
argued that the Montreal Convention of 1971 covered the matter and dictated that by 
detaining the suspects itself, Libya was complying with that document. The UK and US 
took issue with that line of reasoning and argued that the Resolutions took precedence 
over the Montreal Convention. In October 1992, the Court ruled in favor of the UK and 
US 
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In the US, the memory of the bombing was fading behind more recent events such 
as the victory in Operation Desert Storm, the election of President Bill Clinton and the 
bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993. Finally, late in 1993, the new 
administration revisited the Libyan problem. It pushed the UN to renew its efforts to 
force Libyan leader Qadhafi to turn over the suspects. On November 11, 1993, 20 months 
after Resolution 748 was passed and sanctions were imposed, the UN once again adopted 
a resolution condemning the attack and increasing sanctions on Libya until such time as it 
complied with Resolutions 731 and 748. Resolution 883 went further in its sanctions, but 
interestingly enough, specified that the measures “not apply to funds or other financial 
resources derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum products” (UN 
Resolution 883, para 4). Since most of Libya’s revenue derives from oil production, this 
specific omission significantly reduces the impact of the resolution.  
The families of the people killed in the crash of Pan Am flight 103 had reason to 
celebrate in early 1994 when a professor from Edinburgh University, Professor Robert 
Black, and Dr. Ibrahim Legwell, leader of the Libyan defense team apparently came to an 
agreement on the trial. They agreed that the men could be tried in a neutral place by a 
group of international judges. The governments of the United States and the United 
Kingdom immediately rejected the proposal and demanded that the trial be held in either 
of their countries (Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, 2001).  
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After this impasse, the matter languished in the International Court of Justice until 
the beginning of 1998. By this time there were not many people who still believed that 
the sanctions would succeed in getting Qadhafi to turn over al-Megrahi and Fhimah. In 
November 1997, Libya conceded that it would not object to the trial being held in 
Scotland or by Scottish judges. A month later the UN released a report, by its own legal 
experts, which stated that, while a fair trial might be possible using judges, a fair trial by 
jury was not likely. Finally, in April 1998 the obstructions that kept the trial on hold for 
so long seemed to begin breaking apart. With voices in the UN beginning to call for 
lifting of sanctions against Libya, Professor Black was able to convince Muammar 
Qadhafi to support a trial of the two men in a neutral country by Scottish judges using 
Scottish law, but he added that the accused must surrender themselves for the trial 
(Lockerbie Trial Briefing Site, 2001). On 21 July the governments of the UK and US 
stipulated that the arrangements made by Professor Black were acceptable. The trial 
could now proceed.  
The location selected for the trial was Camp Zeist, a former US airbase outside 
Utrecht, in the Netherlands. After many improvements to the base to ensure the security 
of both the judges and the accused, the camp was ready to receive its new occupants. On 
April 5, 1999 the two men, Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah 
surrendered to authorities at the Dutch airbase in Valkenburg. The trial started on May 3, 
2000 and the three Scottish judges handed down their verdict on January 31, 2001.  
The verdict was a mixed victory for the prosecution and all the investigators who 
had invested so many years of hard work. The court found Al-Megrahi guilty of all 
charges and further concluded that he acted “in furtherance of the purposes of...Libyan 
Intelligence Services” (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000, p. 34). The judges decided 
that they had insufficient evidence to find Fhimah guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and 
did not convict him of anything. In Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, the US State 
Department declared “the verdict of the court represents a victory for the international 
effort to hold terrorists accountable for their crimes” (p. 2). 
D. LAWS, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
On August 14, 1989, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater issued a statement 
informing the American public that President Bush was forming a Commission on 
Aviation Security and Terrorism to “review and evaluate policy options in connection 
with aviation security” (The Cumulated Indexes to the Public Papers of Presidents, 1989, 
p. 1060). Furthermore, the commission would “make recommendations regarding 
policies and laws concerning the families of victims of terrorist acts” (The Cumulated 
Indexes to the Public Papers of Presidents, 1989, p. 1060). The work of this commission 
lead to the creation of the Aviation Security Improvement Act, which President Bush 
signed in November 1990. This new law addressed terrorism from the standpoint of 
increased security at airports and on aircraft.  
On the international front, work began in the United Nations, shortly after the 
bombing, to write an international agreement that would make it easier to identify the 
origin and types of plastic explosives that might be used by terrorists. The UN ratified the 
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“Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification” in 
March 1991. As a result of the Pan Am flight 103 bombing, language in the convention 
specified that commercial plastic explosives must contain a chemical marker that would 
identify its origin and manufacturer. The Convention also specified tighter control over 
and limited production of unmarked or undetectable plastic explosives by the countries 
that produced them. The Convention includes a technical annex, which specifies the types 
of explosives regulated in the document (Fact Sheet: International Terrorism 
Conventions, 1998). 
E. SUMMARY 
This first terrorist attack on America after the end of the Cold War set many of the 
precedents that would form the “law enforcement frame” for combating terrorism in the 
1990’s. The fact that the bombing occurred over land, in a country with close ties to the 
US, allowed for a detailed forensic investigation. The attitude and hard work of the FBI 
and the close cooperation with Scottish investigators allowed both countries to build a 
strong legal case. Finally, the sanctions imposed by the UN supplied pressure to Libya to 
turn over the suspects, which supported the desire of the US to use the courts to settle the 
issue. Each of these small facts formed a growing base of support for using laws and 
courts to fight terrorism. As the US responded to subsequent attacks, the manner in which 
the Pan Am case developed influenced the responses to these later attacks. 
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IV. WORLD TRADE CENTER, 1993 
The bombing of the World Trade Center was the second attack to occur after the 
establishment of the law enforcement approach. The way in which the US responded to 
this attack reinforced, in the minds of many US policy makers, many of the positive 
aspects of that approach. Because it happened inside US borders, the attack on the World 
Trade Center (WTC) was more manageable than Pan Am flight 103 for the FBI’s 
terrorism investigators. The search for the perpetrators provided exciting headlines for the 
nation and uncovered more deadly attacks planned against the United States. The 
investigation into the bombing of the WTC also convinced the new Clinton 
Administration that the law enforcement approach was the most effective way to handle 
those who attacked the United States. 
A. THE ATTACK 
The bombing of the WTC took place on February 26, 1993 at a few minutes after 
noon. The bomb was a complex device of 1200 pounds of gunpowder, sulphuric acid, 
urea pellets and nitroglycerine placed in the back of a yellow Ryder truck, along with 
several tanks of hydrogen. The truck was parked in the B-2 level of the parking garage 
under the WTC where it exploded during the lunch hour of most of the people working 
above. The blast tore through five levels of the parking garage and blew a hole 180 feet 
long in the wall between Level B-2 and the subway station under the WTC. The force of 
the explosion hurled a seven-ton steel beam 75 feet from where it braced part of the 
parking structure.  Immediately the whole WTC complex lost power and the lights went 
out 110 stories above the explosion. The shock wave quickly spread and was felt as far 
away as Ellis Island. Within the WTC complex people were trying to get out as fast as 
possible. Many people were trampled and hurt by the press of the crowd. In the high 
towers above people moved quickly to the fire escapes and hurried to descend the many 
flights of stairs and get away from the building, not knowing the extent of the damage. 
Despite the size and placement of the bomb, it did not accomplish what its creator 
had intended. Ramzi Yousef later admitted that he planned to topple one of the two giant 
towers into the other, collapsing both and killing tens of thousands of people. Instead, a 
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large hole was blown in the underground levels of the WTC but only six people were 
killed and just over a thousand injured.   
B. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
As one would expect from such an attack inside a major US city, the first people 
to respond were the emergency services of New York City. The Fire Department 
responded with 750 vehicles and would keep a presence at the scene for a month after the 
attack. Rescue workers immediately set about the difficult task of pulling wounded and 
dead from the rubble. The next morning, as the rescue workers went about their grim 
business at the WTC complex, members of the many Federal agencies tasked to respond 
to such a crisis were meeting at the Federal building at 26 Federal Plaza. Their job was to 
figure out what had happened and who was responsible. At the time of the meeting, the 
New York Police Department (NYPD) still had jurisdiction. All of those present at the 
meeting, however, knew that as soon as it was established that a bomb was responsible 
for the explosion, the case would be handed over to the FBI. In his book, The New 
Jackals, Simon Reeve quotes New York Governor Mario Cuomo the day after the attack. 
“It looks like a bomb. It smells like a bomb.... There is an immense crater. It’s difficult to 
imagine what did that, if not a bomb” (1999, p. 27). Two days after the attack, the FBI 
announced that it had established, through chemical analysis, that a bomb was 
responsible for the blast and that it would be taking over the investigation.  
The FBI, apparently with a nod to the continuing investigation of Pan Am 103, 
named the investigation “Tradebom”. The man who would head the Tradebom 
investigation for the FBI was Neil Herman. He was the Supervisory Special Agent in 
charge of the JTTF, or Joint Terrorist Task Force. The JTTF is an interagency 
investigative group that was originally formed in the early 1980’s to combat a rash of 
bombings by Puerto Rican independence movements in New York City. At the time of 
the bombing of the WTC, the JTTF consisted of between 40 and 50 agents from “FBI, 
NYPD, the State Department, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the US Marshals Service, the ATF, the 
New York State Police and the Port Authority” (Reeve, 1999, p. 16). Herman 
immediately organized them into shifts to allow for around-the-clock work. The men of 
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the JTTF knew that the sooner clues were found, the better their chances of finding those 
responsible. 
Apparently, luck was on the side of the FBI. Just days after the bombing, two 
explosives experts from the JTTF, Donald Sadowy and Joseph Hanlin, descended into the 
crater under the WTC. Almost immediately they located three pieces of what appeared to 
be the rear axle of a van. Because of the way that the metal was twisted and torn, the two 
men quickly realized that these pieces must have come from the van that carried the 
bomb. More importantly, a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) was still visible on the 
metal. By tracing this VIN, investigators were able to link the van to a rental company in 
Jersey City.    
On March 4, 1993, just a week after the bomb exploded, FBI agents arrested 
Mohammed Salameh after he returned to the rental agency to try and reclaim the deposit 
on the van used in the bombing. Amazingly, after going to great lengths to report the van 
stolen prior to the bombing, Salameh returned for the deposit so he would have enough 
money for a plane ticket to escape from the US. After the capture of Salameh, the FBI 
made significant progress in their investigation. The same day they arrested Salameh, the 
FBI searched his apartment. They also obtained his telephone records and began to trace 
every phone number that had been called from that apartment. The clues from the 
apartment also led them to a storage unit containing a deadly collection of chemicals, all 
of which could have been used to make a bomb of the type used at the WTC. 
Furthermore, the FBI lifted fingerprints of Salameh, and others, from the storage unit and 
were then able to indict him for the bombing. Later investigation revealed that Salameh 
had entered the US in February 1988 and had remained illegally after his six-month 
tourist visa expired. 
The leads grew quickly, and so did the arrests. Mahmud Abdoulalima, one of the 
men who helped to build and deliver the bomb, initially flew to back to the Middle East 
and eventually on to Egypt. Once the FBI figured out where he was, the Egyptian 
authorities arrested him and deported him to the US. By the time Abdoulalima was back 
in the US, the FBI had also arrested Nidal Ayyad, who acquired the ingredients for the 
bomb, and Ahmed Ajaj, who helped the others with advice on how to make the bomb 
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(Reeve, 1999, p. 40). From their questioning of the suspects the FBI realized that they 
had yet to capture the ringleader of the group. Clearly, none of the men in custody so far 
was the leader of these terrorists. Investigators did have a name, Ramzi Yousef. On 
March 31, 1993, two weeks after the indictments of Salameh and Ayyad, federal 
prosecutor in New York indicted Yousef for the WTC attack and then set out to find him.  
Meanwhile, the trial of Salameh, Ayyad and Ajaj began in September 1993. They 
were convicted on charges of conspiracy, possession of explosives, and assault on March 
4, 1994 and each received a prison sentence of 240 years. Also, Mahmud Abdoulalima 
was convicted as an accessory and sentenced to eight years in prison. The FBI succeeded 
in quickly capturing many of the people involved in the attack on the WTC. The FBI’s 
search for the man responsible for planning and leading the attack would take much 
longer and not end before Yousef had a chance to carry out more terrorist attacks in other 
parts of the world.  
C. THE LONG TERM RESPONSE 
1. Ramzi Yousef 
Immediately after the bombs went off, Ramzi Yousef got on a plane at JFK 
airport and flew to Karachi, Pakistan. From there, he caught another flight to Quetta, in 
Baluchistan, as far from western influence as he could get. Unlike his accomplices in this 
attack, Yousef had prepared a quick escape from the hornet’s nest he had just kicked over 
in New York. By getting as far away as possible, and into a part of the world where US 
investigators would have difficulty finding and tracking him, Yousef greatly increased his 
chances of eluding capture.  
Meanwhile, back in New York, the FBI, hoping that Yousef might still be in the 
country, offered a two million dollar reward for information leading to his arrest. They 
advertised this reward by taking out an ad in the New York Times (Mickolus, 1997, p. 
313). At the JTTF, Neil Herman assigned six agents to Yousef, the most of any suspect. 
After weeks of investigation the investigators realized that their quarry had fled to 
Pakistan. By establishing a working relationship with their counterparts in Pakistan, the 
investigators from the JTTF were able to continue the search.  
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Investigators now believe that Yousef did not merely hide from them. Instead, he 
linked up with other young radicals and continued to plan and execute terrorist attacks all 
over Asia. These may have included two separate attempts to assassinate Pakistani Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan (both of which failed), an attack on the Israeli 
Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand with a truck bomb (which failed when the driver got cold 
feet and abandoned the truck), and the June 20, 1994 bombing of a Shiite mosque in 
Mashhad, Iran which killed at least 26 pilgrims and wounded over two hundred others 
(Reeve, 1999, p. 66).   
While all this was going on, the members of the JTTF assigned to find Yousef 
were succeeding only in uncovering a cold trail. Despite help from the Pakistani 
authorities, who seemed genuinely interested in helping the Americans, Yousef 
eventually slipped out of Pakistan and into the Philippines to plan his most audacious 
attack ever. In his book, The New Jackals, Simon Reeve hypothesizes that Yousef went 
to the Philippines at the behest of Osama bin Laden to help train the Abu Sayyaf terrorist 
group on Basilan Island (1999, p. 72). Abu Sayyaf is a Muslim terrorist group led by a 
former Filipino Afghan freedom fighter. Once in the Philippines, Yousef began planning 
another bloody phase of his career. Captured documents reveal that Yousef and others 
alternately planned to kill American President Bill Clinton and the Pope, while working 
to perfect a bomb small enough to sneak onto an airplane, yet destructive enough to 
destroy the plane. 
Yousef tested a device on December 11, 1994 by planting it under the seat of a 
Philippine Airlines flight. He got off the plane in Cebu and the bomb exploded as the 
plane continued on to Tokyo, Japan. Although too small to destroy the plane, the bomb 
did kill the passenger in the seat and tore a hole in the floor big enough to destroy control 
rods and force the pilot to make an emergency landing in Okinawa. Yousef was now 
dangerously close to acquiring the capability to covertly destroy an airliner in flight. The 
next plan he concocted would exceed anything previously attempted by terrorists. Yousef 
wanted to blow up eleven US airliners nearly simultaneously. He would accomplish this 
with four other men riding eleven different flights and planting bombs that would 
detonate after the five men had deplaned and disappeared.  
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Fortunately, Yousef failed in this plan because some of the chemicals he was 
mixing for the bombs ignited in his small Manila apartment causing a fire. Yousef 
escaped but an accomplice of his, Abdul Hakim Murad, was arrested when Yousef sent 
him back to the apartment to recover a laptop computer that contained incriminating files. 
The computer was quickly turned over to the FBI who discovered the information about 
the now-foiled plot to bomb the airliners, as well as information about the plans to kill 
President Clinton and the Pope. One other piece of information obtained from the 
computer would prove eerily prophetic. Yousef planned to have Murad fly a plane loaded 
with chemicals into CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia to “demonstrate to the whole 
world that a Muslim martyr is ready and determined to die for the glorification of Islam” 
(Reeve, 1999, p. 87). Again, this plot would be interrupted by the fortunate arrest of 
Murad and the capture of the computer, which would force Yousef back into hiding.  
Yousef flew back to Pakistan and contacted an acquaintance named Ishtiaque 
Parker. Yousef pressured Parker to participate in terrorist attacks, specifically bombing a 
US airliner or kidnapping a Filipino diplomat. Apparently, Yousef wanted to immediately 
execute another bombing to throw investigators off his trail, or capture a diplomat to 
negotiate for Murad’s release. Parker grew frightened and realized that Yousef planned to 
sacrifice him in a quest for revenge. On February 3, 1995 Parker called the US Embassy 
in Islamabad and told them that he had information on the whereabouts of Yousef 
(Reeve, 1999, p. 101). 
Officials in the US Embassy reacted very quickly to fresh information about the 
most wanted terrorist in the world. Unwilling to wait for the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team 
to arrive, FBI and ATF agents on the scene rapidly obtained permission from the 
Pakistani government to apprehend Yousef and extradite him to the United States. On 
February 7, the same FBI agents, along with Pakistani Special Forces, then raided 
Yousef’s apartment in Islamabad, captured him and moved him to the airport to meet a 
plane sent from the US specifically to bring Ramzi Yousef back for trial. It is interesting 
to note the lengths to which the FBI went to ensure Yousef’s uninterrupted return for 
trial. The plane flew nonstop from Islamabad, Pakistan to Newburg, New York, refueling 
in-flight and taking a circuitous route to avoid flying over certain nations. Neil Herman 
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noted “Yousef had to be brought back to the jurisdiction of the US Attorney’s office in 
New York without landing anywhere” (Reeve, 1999, p. 109).  
In the month after Ramzi Yousef’s arrest, authorities in Pakistan, the Philippines 
and Jordan began making arrests of their own. Pakistani investigators arrested a total of 
15 suspects as accomplices in the attacks Yousef planned or carried out in the months 
following the WTC attack. Filipino authorities arrested seven alleged associates of 
Yousef’s for the plot to kill the Pope and the bombing of the Philippine Airlines flight in 
December 1994 (Mickolus, 1997, p. 319-320). Finally, in August of 1995, Eyad 
Mahmoud Ismail Najim was arrested in Jordan, turned over to US officials and returned 
to the US. However, in Pakistan, the authorities were not the only people busy after 
Yousef’s arrest. One month later, two Americans working at the US Consulate in 
Karachi, Pakistan were killed and a third was injured by gunfire while they were stopped 
at a traffic light (Reeve, 199, p. 236). Apparently, this attack on Americans in Pakistan 
was in retaliation for Yousef’s capture 
US prosecutors now had two separate indictments for Yousef. The first was for 
the bombing of the WTC and the second was for the bombing of the airliner in the 
Philippines. Yousef would wait over a year for the trials to begin while prosecutors made 
sure that every detail was ready for the courtroom. The first trial began on May 29, 1996. 
This trial would determine Yousef’s guilt in the Philippine Airline bombing. Yousef 
defended himself, while the Federal Prosecutor submitted over 1000 exhibits and took 
fourteen weeks to prove that Yousef not only bombed the Philippine Airlines flight, but 
also conspired to bomb the eleven American flights later that year. Yousef was found 
guilty on all counts. 
The second trial, for the WTC bombing, began shortly thereafter and this time 
Yousef allowed lawyers to represent him. This trial also included Eyad Mahmoud Ismail 
Najim, the man Jordanian officials had arrested and turned over to the US. Prosecutors 
again took months to make their case and, again, Yousef was found guilty on all counts. 
Najim was also found guilty. The Judge, Kevin Duffy, was the same man who had tried 
the other conspirators in the WTC bombing. He could not sentence Yousef to death 
because there was no Federal death penalty in terrorist cases until 1994, after the 
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bombing took place. Instead, Duffy gave Yousef and Najim the same sentence he handed 
out to the other conspirators, 240 years in prison. Yousef will spend the rest of his life in 
a maximum-security prison in Colorado.   
Ramzi Yousef eluded capture for almost two years. In that time he apparently 
plotted or executed roughly a dozen other terrorist attacks around the world. The US 
Government spent millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours to catch and try this 
leader of the men involved in the WTC attack. Prosecutors spent another year preparing 
for Yousef’s trials. By the time he was in custody, the prosecutors had to prepare two 
trials because Yousef managed to plan and attempt additional attacks against the US in 
the meantime.   
2. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman 
During the investigation and arrests of the men involved with the WTC attack, 
one common trait of all the suspects was their membership in a small New Jersey mosque 
led by Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. Rahman is an interesting figure who evidently 
entered the US first in 1986 from Egypt and again in 1990 from Sudan. He is blind and 
has a large following of supporters in Europe, America and Egypt. In the 1980’s, after the 
assassination of Anwar Sadat, Rahman issued a fatwa condoning the killing and was 
placed under house arrest in Egypt for complicity in that murder. He was later acquitted 
of the charges and left Cairo in 1990 for Sudan (Mickolus, 1997, p. 313). Egypt 
considered him an enemy of the state and wanted him returned to stand trial for the 1989 
murder of a police officer and for plotting to overthrow the Egyptian government (Reeve, 
1999, p.60).  
Later in 1990, despite being listed on the Automated Visa Lookout System as a 
suspected terrorist, he obtained a visa to come to the US. In The New Jackals, Simon 
Reeve alleges that Rahman acquired the visa through the CIA, so that they might 
cultivate him as a source. There is no other data to support this statement. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), apparently unaware of any deal with the 
CIA, moved to deport Rahman in 1991, probably in support of Egypt’s request for return. 
The case was referred to Immigration Court for review. 
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Meanwhile, Rahman used his pulpit at the mosque to extort his followers to “hit 
hard and kill the enemies of God” (Reeve, 1999, p. 60). Evidently Salameh, 
Abdouhalima, Ayyad and Ajaj decided to help Yousef do just that. Soon after the WTC 
attack, on March 17, 1993, Immigration Judge Daniel Meisner ruled that Sheikh Rahman 
could be deported. Rahman appealed the decision and delayed his departure.  
In April 1993, an FBI informant in Rahman’s mosque reported that other 
members of Rahman’s group were plotting a series of follow-on bombings. The 
informant, Emad Salem, reported that the targets would be the Lincoln and Holland 
Tunnels, the Statue of Liberty, the George Washington Bridge and the UN Building. 
Salem led FBI Agents to a warehouse in New York where the bombs were being 
constructed. On June 23, 1993, after a month of recording the men in the warehouse 
going about their deadly work, the FBI arrested twelve men in connection with the plot. 
A week later, on July 2, 1993 agents arrested Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman and indicted 
him under a Federal Sedition Law for encouraging the bombings (Mickolus, 1997, p. 
313). On August 16 US District Court Judge Charles Brieant dismissed Rahman’s appeal 
of the deportation order and supported an earlier appeal of Rahman’s for political asylum. 
In the ruling, Brieant referred to Rahman as a “danger to the security of the US” 
(Mickolus, 1997, p. 313). Finally, on October 15, 1993, Sheikh Rahman appeared in 
court to face charges for his part in the plot to bomb New York landmarks.  
The story of Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman and his peripheral involvement in the 
WTC attack and the plot to bomb other NYC landmarks reveals some of the problems in 
what is otherwise an effective and successful investigation. Despite the success of the 
FBI in uncovering the second plot to bomb landmarks, Rahman’s case revealed a lack of 
communication between federal agencies with regard to suspected terrorists. The State 
Department, the INS and the FBI each had a piece of the puzzle with regard to Rahman’s 
past and proclivities, yet he was allowed to remain in the US for three years while his 
followers plotted terrorist attacks in this country. 
D. LAWS, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
The most significant impact of the 1993 WTC attack was that it proved to 
American law enforcement and government officials that international terrorists could 
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and would operate inside the United States. Prior to 1993 there had been no significant 
international terrorist activity within US borders. With this realization came demands 
from citizens and lawmakers for an increase in the powers of domestic law enforcement 
to meet this new threat. One important new law passed in the aftermath of the WTC 
attack was the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). This law 
created the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, which the Secretary of State has 
discretion over. The law also mandates that financial institutions block the assets and 
report the transactions of groups on the FTO list. 
Information that the terrorists in the WTC attack had entered this country on 
short-term visas and then simply stayed passed their expiration, as well as the extradition 
problems surrounding the Sheikh Rahman case, led to two new laws. The first was the 
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIR/IRA). This act 
“collects and makes readily available useful and current information about foreign 
student visa holders in the United States” (Countering the Changing Threat, 2000). The 
second law established the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC). This court was 
specially set up to handle cases involving the “use of classified information in cases 
involving the expulsion of suspected terrorists” (Countering the Changing Threat, 2000). 
At the end of 2000, this court had still never been used. 
One final important document that appeared after the WTC bombing was 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, US Policy on Counterterrorism, signed in June 
1995. This document is significant because it delineates the missions and responsibilities 
of the various federal agencies involved in fighting terrorism. The PDD also discusses 
interagency cooperation and consequence management in the aftermath of terrorist 
incidents. Although PDD-39 states, “the US shall seek to deter terrorism...and will act 
vigorously to deal with terrorists and their sponsors”, it is significantly oriented towards 
reducing vulnerabilities and reacting to terrorist incidents and less concerned with 
actually deterring potential attacks.  
E. SUMMARY 
The World Trade Center attack of 1993 provides the second case study of the law 
enforcement approach in combating terrorism. The important difference with the Pan Am 
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103 case was that the mastermind of the attack was not hiding in a country that provided 
him protection from the international community. Pakistan and the Philippines both 
wanted to help in Yousef’s capture for their own reasons. The excellent cooperation of 
foreign law enforcement aided in his capture, but only after Ishtiaque Parker decided to 
turn Yousef in to authorities.  
Because this attack took place inside the US, it required the use of law-
enforcement methods and further solidified the authority of the FBI with respect to 
combating terrorism. The FBI did an outstanding job during the initial “crime scene” 
portion investigation and quickly gained valuable leads. The success in rounding up all of 
the suspects, other than Ramzi Yousef, in a few weeks, combined with a rapid indictment 
and trial proved to many that, as in the case of Pan Am 103, the FBI and Federal 















































V. KHOBAR TOWERS, 1996 
While the Tradebom investigation solidified in the minds of many that the FBI 
and Justice Department were capable of rapidly and effectively dealing with terrorists 
who attacked the US, the next major terrorist incident would reveal some of the 
difficulties with this premise. In June 1996, terrorists detonated a bomb outside a US 
military barracks near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. At the time, sanctions against Libya (to 
force the turn over of suspects in the Pan Am 103 case) were in full effect and successful 
prosecution of the suspects in the 1993 WTC attack were demonstrating that America 
could catch and prosecute terrorists. After the Khobar Towers attack, the FBI ran into 
hurdles thrown up by the Saudi government that kept the agents from effectively doing 
their job. This case was the first major overseas terrorist attack during the Clinton 
Administration. Despite obstacles encountered during the investigation, the 
Administration’s and the FBI’s belief in the law enforcement approach for handling 
terrorism would remain strong.  
A. THE ATTACK 
The King Abdul Aziz Airbase, in eastern Saudi Arabia, was the home of the 
4404th Fighter Wing (Provisional) of the US Air Force. These 2900 men and women 
worked hard to enforce the “no-fly zone” in Iraq, as part of Operation Southern Watch. 
During the evening of June 25, 1996, Staff Sergeant Alfredo Guerrero was at his 
observation post on the roof of Building 131. This building was an eight story residential 
barracks that housed approximately 100 Air Force personnel and sat at the corner of the 
American part of the compound, just inside the perimeter fence. At approximately ten 
o’clock that night, as Guerrero watched, a large tanker truck, followed by a white 
Chevrolet Caprice, drove along the road outside the fence and stopped closest to Building 
131. The driver of the truck then backed his vehicle up against the fence. The driver and 
another man got out of the truck, hurried to the waiting car and drove away quickly, 
leaving the truck sitting just 80 feet from the building. 
Staff Sergeant Guerrero, alerted by this strange behavior, called the security desk 
and then, with the help of two other sentries, began evacuating the floors below. 
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Unfortunately, they only had time to get down a few floors before the bomb inside the 
truck went off. The truck, investigators later determined, contained about 5,000 pounds of 
plastic explosives, with the destructive power of 20,000 pounds of TNT. The blast left a 
crater 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep where the truck had been. The blast also was strong 
enough to completely destroy the side of Building 131 that faced the fence, severely 
damage six other nearby buildings, shatter the windows in the rest of the complex and be 
felt as far away as Bahrain, 20 miles to the east. A total of 19 Americans and one Saudi 
civilian were killed, and over 200 Americans were wounded in the bombing. 
B. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
The first response to the bombing was the deployment of the Foreign Emergency 
Response Team (FEST). This is an ad-hoc, rapid response team of representatives from 
various federal agencies. Their job is to assess the requirements for follow-on resources. 
In this case, the day after the bombing, President Clinton announced that an FBI 
investigative team would leave immediately for Saudi Arabia. The team consisted of 70 
agents, including explosive experts, evidence response teams and other agents to assist in 
the investigation. This was the largest deployment of FBI agents in response to a foreign 
attack to date.  
Within a week of arriving in country, the American investigators, working with 
their Saudi counterparts, determined that the perpetrators of the attack were affiliated 
with the people who carried out another attack on Americans six months earlier. The 
earlier attack, which took place in November 1995, left five American servicemen and 
two Indians dead after a car bomb exploded in an American military complex in Riyadh. 
After that attack, the Saudi investigators refused to share information or allow the FBI, 
CIA or US Military to interview suspects. In May 1996 the Saudis quickly convicted and 
beheaded four men accused in the attack without allowing the American investigators any 
contact or sharing of information. It was into this already tense environment that the 
agents tasked to investigate the Khobar Towers bombing landed in June 1996.  
The pattern in the earlier investigation quickly reappeared as the Saudis refused to 
share evidence or leads with the FBI. The Saudis soon arrested 40 suspects, all Shiite 
Muslims believed to be members of the Saudi Hezbollah, a splinter of the Palestinian 
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Hezbollah Party. The Saudis refused to allow US agents to interview these suspects and 
limited the FBI to sifting through the rubble of the building in an effort to get clues. The 
FBI, in frustration, began reducing the number of agents in country until only “a handful” 
remained by late September (“White House”, 1996, November 2). Additionally, FBI 
Director Louis Freeh made three trips to the Saudi Kingdom during this time in an effort 
to improve the cooperation between his agents and the Saudi police. These trips produced 
minute improvements, but nothing substantial. Despite denials by the Clinton 
Administration that agents were returning due to lack of cooperation, by the end of 
October 1996 the final group of FBI personnel left the Kingdom. The investigation into 
the bombing of Khobar Towers, from the American standpoint, had come to a halt. The 
reasons for this lack of cooperation can be attributed to both the FBI and the Saudis. In a 
June 1998 article in the New York Times, Philip Shenon quotes a senior Clinton 
Administration official who blamed the problems on “a big cultural gulf” and a “[lack] of 
experience in dealing with each other in these matters” (Shenon & Johnson, 1998, June 
21).  
For it’s part, the Pentagon quickly announced that it would increase security for 
US military service personnel in Saudi Arabia by enlarging its intelligence collection 
efforts and by adding more sensors to the perimeter security of US bases to aid in the 
detection of bombs. Secretary of Defense William Perry asked retired General Wayne 
Downing to lead an investigation into the bombing. The report of this investigation, 
which was released some months later, concerned itself with determining responsibility 
on the part of US commanders in the attack and recommending added force protection 
measures, and did not attempt to investigate who the terrorists might have been. By the 
end of July the troops from the Khobar base were moved to Ridyahol, a more secluded 
base some distance away from Khobar.  
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As for the possibility of the Pentagon conducting an investigation into the origins 
of the attack and its perpetrators, in a June 1998 article in the New York Times, Pentagon 
spokesman Kenneth Bacon was quoted as saying, “We’ve been very clear from the 
beginning: this is the FBI’s job” (Shenon & Johnson, 1998, June 21). This attitude 
prompted a relative of one of the victims to speculate, in the same article, that the 
Pentagon was unwilling to pressure the Saudi government for fear of losing access to 
important bases in the Kingdom. These bases are critical in the enforcement of “no-fly 
zones” in Iraq. The comment by Bacon and the focus of the Downing Report indicate that 
by the mid-1990s, the military had accepted the primacy of the FBI in countering 
international terrorism.  
C. THE LONG TERM RESPONSE 
1. Hani El-Sayegh 
In March 1997 Canadian police arrested a Saudi national named Hani El-Sayegh 
and held him in connection with the Khobar Towers bombing. The Canadian government 
notified the FBI of their arrest and agents soon arrived in Canada to talk with the suspect. 
El-Sayegh met with the US investigators in May 1997 and informed them that he had 
information pertinent to ongoing terrorist investigations. The government of Canada 
decided to deport El-Sayegh to the US as a suspect in the Khobar Towers bombing. In 
June 1997, after arriving in the US, El-Sayegh made a series of admissions, some of 
which were unrelated to the Khobar Towers attack, and arranged a deal with the FBI 
based on those admissions. As part of his disclosure, El-Sayegh implicated senior Iranian 
intelligence officials in the Khobar Towers attack. The Department of Justice entered a 
plea agreement and indicted him on June 13, 1997.  
Meanwhile, the Saudi government notified the US that it would seek the 
extradition of El-Sayegh as a suspect in the Khobar attack. El-Sayegh, alarmed at the 
possibility of extradition to Saudi Arabia, filed a motion to halt the extradition claiming 
certain execution if he returned to the Kingdom. Then, unexpectedly, he reneged on his 
plea agreement and refused to cooperate with the FBI. In September 1997, the Justice 
Department, suddenly without a witness willing to testify, filed a petition to dismiss the 
indictment and allow the extradition. El-Sayegh fought the extradition by seeking 
political asylum. The asylum was denied, and two years later, on October 11, 1999, El-
Sayegh was expelled from the US to Saudi Arabia. 
This chain of events seems very strange considering that the FBI was having so 
much trouble gathering clues in the Khobar investigation. The fact that the Department of 
Justice had, in custody, a prime suspect in the attack, and then turned him over to the 
Saudi government is hard to explain, especially considering the lack of Saudi cooperation 
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in the aftermath of the attack. In the indictment released by the Department of Justice in 
June 2001, El-Sayegh was named as the driver of one of the vehicles used in the attack.  
2. The Iranian Connection  
The implication of Iranian officials by El-Sayegh would be only the first such 
accusation in this investigation. The Saudi government, by 1998, was also claiming that 
the Iranians were involved in the selection of the target and the training of the individuals 
involved. The US government was, apparently, reluctant to implicate the Iranians after 
the May 1997 election of a more moderate Iranian government led by President 
Mohammad Khatami. The new Iranian president was calling for better contacts with the 
West and both the Clinton Administration and the Saudi government saw this change in 
Iranian leadership as a chance to improve relations. President Khatami denied Iranian 
involvement in the bombing and, in an apparent effort not to increase tensions, President 
Clinton, in August 1999, made an unusual request by asking the Iranian government to 
help in the investigation. The Iranians went no further than to reiterate their innocence. 
According to the indictment released by the Department of Justice in 2001, Iranian 
intelligence officials provided advice and money to the group that planned and executed 
the bombing. The indictment goes on to note “the attack would serve Iran by driving the 
Americans from the Gulf region” (FBI Press Release-Khobar Towers Release, 2001, June 
21).  
3. A New Administration 
By the end of 1999 the investigation into the bombing of Khobar Towers had 
been effectively halted. The roadblocks put up by the Saudi government, the loss of an 
important source of information after the return of El-Sayegh to Saudi Arabia and the 
ponderous maneuvers of a reluctant administration allowed very little working room for 
the FBI. Despite the difficulties being encountered at the time, FBI Director Louis Freeh 
maintained his desire to solve the case.  
According to a report in the April 2, 2001 issue of US News and World Report, 
Freeh cultivated a relationship with the Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan, over 
time and was finally able to get access to suspects held in Saudi jails. The report goes on 
to say that Freeh also waited until the Bush Administration took office to push for a 
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renewed emphasis on the case (Ragavan et al., 2001, April 2). By appealing to the new 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, to intervene on his behalf with the Saudis, and by 
pressing to move the case from the US Attorney’s office in Washington DC to the US 
Attorney’s office in Richmond Virginia, Freeh was able to breathe new life into the 
investigation. By June 2001, on the eve of his retirement, Louis Freeh watched as a grand 
jury in Alexandria Virginia indicted 13 members of Saudi Hezbollah and one unnamed 
member of Lebanese Hezbollah.  
The indictment came after five years of difficult maneuvers to gain information 
on the people responsible for the attack. The Iranians are identified as an important part 
of the plot, but the indictment stops short of charging them with any crime. According to 
one law enforcement official “roughly half of the 14 named defendants are already in 
custody in the Middle East” (Lichtblau, 2001, June 22). The FBI is hunting for the rest of 
the defendants and those already in custody have not yet been extradited to the US for 
trial. 
D. LAWS, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
After the devastating terrorist attacks of the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
international community began to look for ways to increase the chances of halting or 
catching those responsible for these devastating bombings. After the Khobar Towers 
bombing, the US government took the lead in the international community to pass a UN 
Convention to assist nations in this area. The result was the ratification, in December 
1997, of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. This 
Convention “expands the legal framework for international cooperation in the 
investigation, prosecution, and extradition of persons who engage in terrorist bombings” 
(Fact Sheet: International Terrorism Conventions, 1998). This Convention also mandates 
the criminalization of certain acts and the extradition of persons accused of such offenses. 
The language seems to indicate an effort by the authors to solve the kinds of problems 
encountered by the US during the Khobar investigation.  
Two other important documents resulting from the Khobar Towers bombing were 
Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 62 and 63. President Clinton signed both in May 
1998, shortly before the Embassy bombings in Africa. PDD-62 restated much of 
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President Clinton’s first policy paper on counter-terrorism, PDD-39, but also went further 
in rectifying areas of confusion encountered during the Khobar Towers investigation. An 
unclassified fact sheet explains that PDD-62 clarifies the roles of Federal agencies “in the 
wide range of US counter-terrorist programs, from apprehension and prosecution of 
terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and 
protecting...computer based systems” (Fact Sheet-Combating Terrorism, 1998). PDD-63 
was directed at critical national infrastructures. It created the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (NIPC), which is tasked with defending telecommunications, banking, 
transportation, and other critical infrastructures from electronic attack by terrorists. 
E. SUMMARY 
The US response to the attack at Khobar Towers followed the established law 
enforcement approach, but encountered unanticipated problems. The refusal of the Saudi 
government to allow the FBI access to its suspects effectively halted the in-country 
portion of the investigation. The one suspect taken into custody outside of Saudi Arabia 
provided valuable information to the FBI, including information on apparent Iranian 
involvement in the plot. Due to a series of unusual decisions by the Department of 
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VI. EMBASSY BOMBINGS, 1998 
Slightly more than two years after the Khobar towers bombing, terrorists launched 
a pair of deadly attacks at Americans abroad. These bombings, of the US Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, would return terrorism to the forefront of American attention. The 
US response included, for the first time since the 1986 bombing of Libya, the US’s 
offensive military capability. The response also included an attempt to address the larger 
terrorist apparatus, with the indictment of al-Qaeda members believed responsible for 
planning and financing the attack. 
A. THE ATTACK 
The US Embassy in Kenya sits on “one of the busiest intersections in Nairobi’s 
commercial and government center” (Miller & Murphy, 1998). The morning of August 
7th had begun like any other until a Mitsubishi pick-up truck drove up to the Embassy’s 
main entrance. The men in the truck tried to gain entrance to the Embassy compound but 
were turned away. Next, they drove down a side street, between the Embassy and the 
Ufundi Office Building and tried to gain admittance to the basement garage. Five Kenyan 
guards, armed only with wooden clubs, manned this entrance. When the guards began 
arguing with the occupants of the vehicle, an armed US Marine approached the truck to 
find out what was going on. Upon seeing the Marine, “five Arab-looking men” jumped 
out of the truck, began shooting at the Embassy guards, and running away (“Investigators 
May Have Found Key Bomb Clue”, 1998). One of the men threw a hand grenade in the 
direction of the guards. This commotion drew the attention of people inside the Embassy 
who “looked out the embassy window and saw people running away…[the grenade 
explosion] lured hundreds of workers to the windows, where they felt the full force of a 
larger bomb” (Lynch, 2001). The blast, from 500 pounds of explosives in the back of the 
pick-up truck, tore a chunk out of the wall of the Embassy and shattered the windows of 
the Embassy and all of the surrounding buildings. The Ufundi Building absorbed the 
brunt of the blast across the street. The explosion leveled the five-story office building, 
killing most of its occupants. Within the Embassy itself, twelve Americans and 31 
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Foreign Service Nationals were killed. In total, 212 people were killed and over 4500 
wounded by the truck bomb detonated in Nairobi. 
Unfortunately, that was not the end of the violence that day. A few minutes after 
the terrible events in Nairobi, a second bomb exploded, this time in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania. The driver of the truck carrying this bomb pulled up behind a blue water truck 
that was making a routine delivery to the Embassy. The water truck was halted at the gate 
while a Foreign Service National guard examined the underside with a mirror The 
bomber detonated his deadly load approximately 35 feet from the Embassy wall. The 
water truck, the thick cement barrier and the closed gate absorbed most of the blast and as 
a result only eleven people were killed, including seven Foreign Service Nationals, and 
72 were wounded, including two Americans. The damage to the Embassy itself was 
extensive; however, due to its location on the outskirts of the city, damage to other 
buildings and collateral loss-of-life were relatively low (Report of the Accountability 
Review Board, 1999). 
B. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
As with the Khobar Towers attack, the first US response came in the form of two 
Foreign Emergency Response Teams (FEST), one for each country. According to the 
State Department’s Accountability Board Report, both teams arrived at their respective 
destinations approximately 40 hours after the attacks occurred. While this may seem like 
a rapid response, the report notes that they were delayed for approximately 13 hours, due 
to mechanical problems, and experienced miscommunication between federal agencies 
about who would comprise the teams. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of these teams 
was to determine the requirements for follow-on resources. The primary response came 
in the form of rescue teams to treat the wounded and search for the missing, as well as 
FBI investigative teams to begin the search for clues and gather evidence in what would 
become a large criminal case. An FBI press release from August 10, 1998 notes “over 
100 FBI personnel are now on site in Kenya and Tanzania” (FBI Press Release-
Bombings, 1998). By August 27, 1998, according to another press release, that number 
had grown to “over 300 FBI personnel consisting of bomb technicians, laboratory 
personnel, investigators, Evidence Response Teams, and others have been in East Africa 
working side-by-side with Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities” (FBI Press Release-East 
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Africa, 1998). The rescue effort was substantial as well and included teams from the 
United States, France and Israel.  
Unlike the Khobar Towers investigation, the FBI received ample cooperation 
from the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments. Investigators quickly located debris from 
each of the vehicles that carried the bombs. This allowed for rapid identification of the 
type of explosives used and produced leads with respect to who the bombers might have 
been. On August 11, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, announced a $2 
million reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of those responsible 
for the attacks. By August 12 the Tanzanian police had arrested 14 people including “six 
Sudanese, six Iraqis, a Somali and a Turk” (“Investigators May Have Found Key Bomb 
Clue”, 1998). The FBI soon gained access to these suspects for questioning. The 
following day Kenya announced its first arrests in the investigation. A statement from 
Kenyan President Daniel Moi’s office noted that “a number of persons have been 
detained in relation to this incident and are proving useful leads in the circumstances 
surrounding the blast” (Lewthwaite, 1998).  
The first significant apprehension actually happened on the day of the bombings, 
in Pakistan. On August 7, Pakistani border officials arrested Mohammad Saddiq Odeh 
while he was trying to cross into Afghanistan using a forged Yemeni passport. Pakistani 
authorities questioned him and realized that he was connected to the bombings in Africa. 
They quickly decided to extradite him to Kenya. At the same time US officials, alerted to 
the arrest, dispatched CIA agents to Pakistan to question Odeh. The Pakistani officials 
refused all foreign access to Odeh, and the CIA agents were forced to follow him to 
Nairobi in another plane. Immediately upon his arrival in Kenya, on August 16, the local 
police took Odeh into custody and allowed him to be questioned by FBI agents. During 
questioning Odeh revealed the names of two other men involved in the bombing who had 
also fled to Pakistan. On August 19, Pakistani authorities arrested the two men, a Saudi 
and a Sudanese, and both men were eventually brought to the US and indicted.  
On August 18, six Kenyan police and 15 FBI agents raided The Hilltop Hotel in 
Nairobi. Extensive interviews of detainees had revealed that the hotel was where the 
terrorists constructed the bomb used in Kenya. The agents carried off bags of evidence, 
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but this news was quickly subsumed but a much more significant response to the attacks. 
On August 20, President Clinton ordered the US military to strike targets in Sudan and 
Afghanistan with cruise missiles in retaliation for the bombing of the Embassies. These 
strikes will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. The next significant development 
in the legal case was the return to the US of Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali. Al-Owhali was 
apprehended in Kenya shortly after the bombings and admitted being trained by al-
Qaeda. The US Attorney who charged Al-Owhali, Mary Jo White, was quoted as saying 
“Today’s charges show this nation’s commitment to track down and prosecute all those 
who commit…acts of international terrorism…. This investigation will not end until 
every terrorist involved in the bombings…is identified, taken into custody and prosecuted 
to the fullest extent of the law” (FBI Press Release-East Africa, 1998). The next day 
Mohammad Odeh was also brought to the US and formally charged for his involvement 
in the bombings. A press release acknowledged and praised the support of the Kenyan 
and Tanzanian governments for their help in this case. Because of this support, by the end 
of the first month after the bombing US investigators had four of the 22 people they 
would later indict for this attack in custody.  
C. THE LONG TERM RESPONSE 
1. World-wide Hunt for Terrorists 
The long-term response to the bombing of US Embassies in Africa can be 
summarized as one of deciding that the larger terrorist apparatus, which supported and 
funded the perpetrators, must be dealt with in order to interrupt planning for future 
attacks. By 1998 the FBI and CIA had extensive records of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda 
network. When all three of the suspects turned over by the Pakistani government in the 
African Embassy bombings admitted ties to al-Qaeda, the Clinton administration decided 
to act against other al-Qaeda members that it had identified. As with the suspects in the 
Embassy attacks, the suspects apprehended in this wider-scoped operation were those that 
the FBI and CIA had enough evidence against to warrant an indictment in US Federal 
Court.  
The first of these suspects was a former US Army sergeant named Ali Mohamed. 
Mohamed had served in his native Egyptian Army before moving to the US and joining 
the US Army. Originally subpoenaed to testify in another case, Mohamed evidently 
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perjured himself and was immediately arrested. Meanwhile, evidence uncovered during 
the investigation into the Embassy bombings linked him to the attacks and, in September 
1998, Mohamed was charged in a closed hearing for his involvement in the attacks. In 
October 2000, he pleaded guilty to the charges and claimed to be a member of al-Qaeda. 
As part of a plea agreement, Mohamed detailed his involvement in the Embassy 
bombings. Recruited in the late-1980s, he was ordered to Nairobi by Osama bin Laden to 
scout for potential US, British, French and Israeli targets there.  
Other suspects followed from all over the world. An October 1998 article in the 
Christian Science Monitor reported that there were “some two dozen suspected bin Laden 
associated arrested in seven countries on three continents since the embassy attacks” 
(Landay, 1998). These included Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who was captured in South 
Africa in October 1999 and quickly extradited to the US.  In an update posted on the 
State Department web site from August 7, 2000, the Department listed its efforts in the 
two years since the bombings. On June 16, 1999 the Justice Department released the 
indictment of 17 men connected with the bombings. The site notes that the 17 men had 
been indicted “for their involvement in the two bombings and terrorist crimes…six of 
these suspects are in US custody awaiting trial…three are in custody in the United 
Kingdom pending extradition…[and] eight others remain at large” (Fact Sheet: US 
Counterterror Efforts, 2000). The captures of suspects were proceeding quickly. Now it 
was up to the Justice Department to successfully try and convict these people. 
The trial of four of the defendants began on January 3, 2001. The men to go on 
trial first were Mohammad Saddiq Odeh, Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali, Khalfan Khamis 
Mohamed and Wadih El-Hage, a naturalized US citizen. Both Mohamed and Al-Owhali 
were accused of crimes carrying the death penalty. The prosecution took tree months to 
deliver 1300 exhibits and call 92 witnesses in proving its case. On May 29, 2001, the jury 
return guilty verdicts for all of the men. The rest of the men listed on the indictment 





2. The US Missile Attacks 
The President and his advisors also decided that more active steps were necessary 
to show US resolve in combating terrorism. On August 20, 1998 the US military 
launched Operation Infinite Reach, a cruise missile attack on suspected terrorist facilities 
in Sudan and Afghanistan.  In a New York Times article published on October 27, 1999, 
James Risen details the timeline of events leading up to the missile strikes. He notes that 
the White House ordered an initial target list of sites connected with bin Laden on August 
8, 1998, the day after the attack. A list of sites meeting the criteria already existed and 
was duly produced by the CIA. While the military and White House considered the list, 
according to Risen, another report, received on August 13, indicated that bin Laden and 
others would be meeting at a camp near Khost, Afghanistan on August 20. This 
information lent urgency to the decision-making. On August 19, the President decided on 
a final list of targets, including six camps in Afghanistan and a chemical plant in Sudan. 
If Risen’s information is accurate, it presents some problems with statements made by 
Administration officials about the missile attack. Such a rapid response contradicts 
President Clinton’s statement that the missile attack was “to strike at terrorist-related 
facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat the presented to our 
national security” and Under Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering’s statement that “the 
main purpose of the strikes was not retaliation; it was to prevent further terrorist attacks” 
(“Key Quotes”, 1998). 
Since no suspects were in US custody until after August 10, the request for targets 
related to bin Laden on the 8th indicates a desire by the White House to strike back at any 
meaningful target, regardless of its connection with the Embassy bombings. Furthermore, 
the specific targeting of a camp where Osama bin Laden was believed to be on the day of 
the attacks contradicts a statement by Secretary of Defense William Cohen on August 
21st, “we did not target, specifically, individuals” (“Key Quotes”, 1998). The missile 
attack set off a storm of debate about the appropriateness of responding with military 
force. The President and his advisors stood by their decision, apparently satisfied that 
they had dealt a significant blow to al-Qaeda with the missiles. National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger stated on August 21, 1998, “I am absolutely certain that had we not done 
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this (military strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan) we would have been the victim of other 
terrorist attacks in the not too distant future” (“Key Quotes”, 1998).  
D. LAWS, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
After the capture or indictment of 22 men in connection with the bombings of the 
Embassies, work began on new international and unilateral US resolutions to help speed 
the process in future investigations. The primary purpose of these diplomatic maneuvers 
was to coerce help from nations, such as Afghanistan, in capturing the men indicted for 
the bombing. As soon as investigators had sufficient evidence to implicate Osama bin 
Laden, and the other members of al-Qaeda known to be hiding in Afghanistan, President 
Clinton authorized the missile strike. President Clinton also, on the same day, amended 
Executive Order 12947 adding al-Qaeda to the State Department’s list of terrorist 
organizations. This would effectively freeze their assets in the US and prohibit contact 
with al-Qaeda by US citizens. When that did not produce any results, the President signed 
an Executive Order, in July 1999, imposing sanctions against the Taliban rulers of 
Afghanistan, banning all trade with the Taliban, and freezing their assets in the United 
States. The goal of this order was to make the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden for 
prosecution. Meanwhile, the US lobbied in the UN for a resolution aimed at the same 
result. In October 1999 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267, 
which demanded the surrender of bin Laden and imposed further sanctions against the 
Taliban. 
E. SUMMARY 
The response to the bombing of the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was 
different from the response to the Khobar Towers bombing in a number of ways. First, 
the FBI received unreserved assistance from the countries where the attacks occurred. 
The attitude of both Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities was a welcome change, for the 
FBI, from the behavior of the Saudi officials. In its numerous press releases after the 
Embassy bombings, the FBI was careful to praise the assistance provided by the two 
African nations. This help allowed for a much faster apprehension of suspects, evidence 
that resulted in indictments of al-Qaeda leaders, and a trial that began in January 2001, 
five months before the indictments were released in the Khobar Towers case.  
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The assistance from Pakistan, in arresting and turning over three of the terrorists, 
was also a welcome event. Pakistan had earlier assisted US authorities with the capture of 
Ramzi Yousef, in connection with the WTC bombing in 1993, and Mir Aimal Kanzi, 
who was later convicted of killing two CIA employees and wounding three others outside 
CIA headquarters in 1993. The assistance from Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan made the 
job of the FBI much easier and seemed to validate the belief that other nations wanted to 
fight terrorism as much as the US, especially if participation in that fight entailed merely 
handing over suspects who were sure to be treated well and afforded excellent legal 
representation in the US.  
Also, for the first time since 1986, the US elected to use military force in response 
to a terrorist attack. The missile attack sparked an intense debate over its appropriateness 
and effectiveness. This attack is the only time that the US used military force in response 
to a terrorist attack during the period between 1988 and 2000.  
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VII. THE USS COLE, 2000 
The final terrorist attack against the United States that will be examined in this 
study is the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. This was the last large-scale attack 
prior to the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. 
These later attacks would bring drastic changes to the US counter-terrorism policy. The 
actions taken by the Clinton Administration after the attack in Yemen were influenced by 
the fact that the FBI anticipated problems similar to those encountered in Saudi Arabia 
after the Khobar Towers attack, and tried to avoid them.  
A. THE ATTACK 
The USS Cole is a guided missile destroyer, 505 feet long with a crew of 350 men 
and women. On the morning of October 12, 2000, the Cole arrived in the Yemeni port of 
Aden, to refuel on its way to the Persian Gulf. At a few minutes after noon, as the ship 
was moving into position to take on fuel, she was approached by the small harbor vessels 
which typically take mooring lines from the ship to the floating fuel station in the harbor. 
One of these small boats took a line from the Cole to the fuel station and then returned to 
the port side of the US ship. Sailors on the deck reported later that the two men in the 20-
foot harbor craft stood at attention as it drew up against the outer hull of the Cole and 
then exploded, killing the two men instantly. Investigators later determined that the boat 
was loaded with C-4 military plastic explosives. The explosion tore a 40-foot by 40-foot 
hole in the hull of the Cole, right at the waterline. Sailors in the immediate area of the 
blast were killed, burned or trapped as the explosion ripped through one of the main 
engine rooms and an auxiliary engineering space immediately adjacent to the hull where 
the explosion occurred. The Cole shook violently as shock waves, strong enough to warp 
hatchways at the top of the ship, passed through her structure. Later, after valiant efforts 
by the crew and rescue workers to free trapped sailors and keep the ship afloat, the Navy 





B. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
The US Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for US forces in 
Yemen, quickly dispatched a medical assessment team, consisting of doctors, nurses, and 
communications people. CENTCOM also sent a medical trauma team, which was already 
in Saudi Arabia. The team consisted of an additional two doctors, two nurses and three 
medical technicians. News of the explosion reached Washington just before six in the 
morning. The Foreign Emergency Response Team (FEST) was quickly assembled and 
departed later that morning for Yemen. Additionally, a Marine Corps Fleet Anti-terrorism 
Security Team (FAST) arrived in Yemen to provide security for the Cole and her crew 
while the latter worked to keep the ship afloat and free trapped sailors. All of this activity 
occurred within a day of the attack. In a news conference the day after the attack, 
Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon, announced that, in addition to the groups already in 
Yemen, two groups of FBI agents, totaling 100, were on their way to Yemen to begin a 
criminal investigation into the bombing (Bacon, 2000, October 13). The Clinton 
Administration was following its familiar response plan for terrorist attacks against 
Americans abroad, but not with unanimous approval in the State Department. Apparently, 
the US Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, felt that large numbers of US personnel 
in Yemen was not a good idea. She initially argued for limiting the FBI contingent to 
about 15 personnel.  
For their part, the Yemeni government was also trying to figure out what caused 
this terrible explosion in their port. Strangely enough, they did not believe initially that 
the explosion was an act of terrorism. In a news conference on 14 October, Yemeni 
President Ali Abdallah Salih stated that the explosion was caused by an accident on the 
ship (Schneider & Suro, 2000, October 15). This belief was echoed in Yemen’s print and 
broadcast media. The Foreign Ministry also released a statement the same day stating that 
Yemen “does not accept the presence of terrorists on its territories” (as quoted in 
Schneider & Suro, 2000). Nevertheless, the Yemenis were, at the same time, beginning to 
detain and question witnesses. By October 17 investigators followed leads to an 
apartment near the port, where they found bomb making materiel. Faced with this 
evidence President Salih quickly reversed himself and admitted that the explosion was a 
“planned criminal act” (Sipress & Vise, 2000, October 18).  
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While US officials were quick to praise Yemen’s willingness to allow US 
investigators into the country, they also admitted that their agents were not participating 
in the questioning. The agents, at this point, were working hard to gather physical and 
forensic evidence from the harbor and the Cole itself. The FBI was very anxious to 
workout procedures for cooperation between their agents and the Yemenis for the 
questioning of witnesses and suspects. At the same time, no doubt because of the 
difficulties encountered during the Khobar Towers investigation, the agents did not even 
attempt to have the Yemenis impound vehicles, secure the crime scene or share records. 
In an effort to keep their investigation on track, FBI Director Louis Freeh and the FBI’s 
head of counter-terrorism, Dale Watson, flew to Yemen on 17 October to personally 
negotiate an agreement of cooperation in the investigation.  
For its part, the Department of Defense announced that agents from the Naval 
Investigative Service (NIS) would cooperate with the FBI on the investigation. DOD’s 
primary emphasis, as in the Khobar Towers attack, focused on determining if any errors 
in judgment had caused the deaths of the 17 sailors. Less than a week after the bombing, 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that he would appoint two senior retired 
officers to conduct an investigation into the bombing “with special focus on whether 
there were security lapses” (Sipress & Vise, 2000, October 18). The investigators 
released their findings on January 9, 2001 and, although they did not single out one 
individual for blame, the investigators did find “significant shortcomings in security 
throughout the region” (Terrorist attack on USS Cole, 2001).  
By October 25, less than two weeks after the bombing, Yemeni and FBI 
investigators had identified and searched three safe-houses used by the terrorists. The 
first turned out to be a workshop for preparing the boat used in the attack, the second was 
where the terrorists built their bomb and the third, an apartment overlooking Aden’s port, 
was a lookout station. From these locations investigators followed leads to Saudi Arabia, 
a farming region north of Aden known as Lahej, and the Yemeni province of Hadramaut, 
a remote part of the country where the central government’s influence is minimal. At this 
point, the Yemenis took their first suspect into custody.  
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In an interview reported in the Washington Post on October 26, 2000, Yemeni 
President Salih confirmed that the suspect was an Egyptian man with ties to Islamic 
militants who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union.  The same article also 
reported that Clinton Administration officials were acknowledging a growing body of 
evidence that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization were behind the attack on 
the USS Cole (Sipress & Vise, 2000, October 26). Nevertheless, a group of 40 FBI agents 
left Yemen on October 25, with another similarly sized group departing the next day.  
The FBI acknowledged the departure of the agents, citing an end to the physical 
evidence-gathering portion of the investigation as the reason. However, a statement 
released by the State Department, on October 27, echoes the statements made by the 
Clinton Administration at the height of its problems with the Saudi Government during 
the Khobar Towers investigation.  
The US Government would like to express its appreciation to the 
Government of Yemen for its early cooperation given to the investigators 
working jointly on the forensic examinations at various locations in 
Yemen…The next critical phase will require Yemeni and US personnel to 
work as partners in the collection of information and participants in the 
interview process of witnesses to this criminal act of terrorism. We count 
on President Salih’s commitment of full cooperation. (Statement on 
Investigation of the USS Cole bombings, 2000) 
This statement appears to be an attempt to forestall official resistance by the 
Yemeni Government to FBI participation in questioning of suspects and witnesses. 
Evidently, the statement failed when, the day after it was released, President Salih told a 
Yemeni television interviewer “it is out of the question for Americans to investigate 
Yemenis” (Sipress, 2000, October 29). This official standoff would continue for months. 
C. THE LONG TERM RESPONSE 
The long-term response to the bombing of the USS Cole encompasses a much 
shorter period of time than the other attacks examined in this study. The terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 overshadowed the investigation in Yemen. Al-Qaeda members, 
the primary suspects in the attack on the Cole, became part of the larger, post-September 
11 effort by the United States. There were, however, some interesting developments 
during the long-term investigation into the bombing that bear examination.  
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Despite the Clinton Administration and Yemeni Government being at loggerheads 
over how to proceed in the investigation, less than a month had passed since the attack. 
With the American public and press still demanding to know what was being done, the 
US investigators began serious negotiations to gain some sort of meaningful participation 
in the search for those responsible; yet the FBI met obstacles at every turn. On November 
2, 2000 the Washington Post reported that problems arose over a videotape given to the 
FBI by the Yemenis. The tape, taken from a harbor security camera on the day of the 
attack, had been edited. The Yemenis refused to give the FBI an unedited copy. 
The main point of contention between the two groups was US participation in the 
questioning of suspects and witnesses. Initially, as indicated by the statements of 
President Salih, the Yemenis refused to allow US agents to take part in questioning. 
Later, the Yemenis demanded access to all evidence collected by the FBI, anywhere in 
the world, in exchange for cooperation in the questioning; the FBI flatly refused. The 
reason that the FBI needed to be present during questioning was that US courts require an 
unadulterated chain of evidence. Without first hand transcripts, the FBI could not swear 
that there had not been changes made to the answers. As one US official put it, “This is a 
fundamental issue. If we are ever going to indict someone, there has to be an evidence 
trail that can stand up in a court of law” (Vise, 2000, November 2).  
While these negotiations continued, the Yemenis took four men into custody for 
involvement in the bombing. The investigators had followed leads to Lahej, the farming 
area north of Aden, where they learned that officials in that region issued illegal identity 
cards to the four men. Both the men in custody and the officials from Lahej had ties to 
the Afghani mujahadeen. The argument that al-Qaeda was involved in the bombing was 
gaining credibility in the Clinton Administration.  
Finally the Clinton Administration and the Yemeni Government reached an 
agreement over the participation of US agents in the questioning of suspects. On 
November 29, 2000 they signed a memorandum stipulating that US investigators could 
be present and submit questions in writing to Yemeni officials, who would the pose them 
to the suspects. Although the Clinton Administration hailed the breakthrough, Vincent 
Cannistraro, a former director of counter-terrorist operations for the CIA, noted “the lack 
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of direct interrogation would make it difficult for investigators to build a case that would 
hold up in American courts” (Vise & Eggen, 2000, November 30).  
In January 2001, the State Department offered a $5 million dollar reward for 
information on the bombing. By June 2001, Yemen was detaining nine men in 
connection with the bombing of the USS Cole. The Yemeni Government was ready to 
begin trials for the suspects, against FBI wishes that the trials be delayed while US agents 
gathered more evidence. Tensions over the FBI’s access to these men had lessened and, 
under pressure from the US Embassy in Yemen, the number of US investigators had been 
reduced to approximately 15 agents. The man in charge of these agents was John O’Neill, 
an FBI counter-terrorist specialist from the Bureau’s New York office. He and US 
Ambassador Barbara Bodine clashed repeatedly about the agents’ presence in Yemen. 
She refused to allow O’Neill and his agents to carry automatic rifles for self-defense. 
Therefore, when intelligence detected a new threat against Americans in Yemen, O’Neill 
pulled all of his agents out of the country for security reasons. Bodine, citing the FBI’s 
overly aggressive tactics refused to allow the agents back into Yemen the following 
month. For its part, the Yemeni government responded quickly by arresting nine people 
suspected of plotting these anticipated, but never executed, attacks. Despite State and 
Justice Department attempts to end the friction in Yemen, the investigation had, once 
again, stalled. (Loeb, 2001) 
One final break in the investigation into the bombing of the Cole occurred after 
the suicide attacks against the US by al-Qaeda terrorists in September 2001. In the 
aftermath of those attacks, Pakistan was working hard to identify and arrest suspected al-
Qaeda operatives in that country. One of the men identified by both the US and Pakistan 
was Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, a Yemeni student studying in Karachi. In late 
October 2001, Mohammed was arrested by Pakistani intelligence agents and handed over 
to the US for extradition. Mohammed was the first suspect captured by the US outside of 
Yemen after the investigation started, one year earlier. 
D. LAWS, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
The bombing of the USS Cole did not result in any new laws or treaties for the 
US Government. As mentioned earlier, most of the evidence produced by the US 
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investigators pointed to al-Qaeda involvement in the attack. Since the September 2001 
attacks in the US, the efforts to deal decisively with al-Qaeda have subsumed any earlier 
efforts. The only agreement signed between the US and Yemen during the investigation 
was a memorandum of understanding on the methods to be used during questioning of 
suspects by US agents.   
E. SUMMARY 
At the time of this writing, six months after the attacks in New York and 
Washington DC, progress in the USS Cole investigation cannot be measured except in 
terms of the progress in the war on terrorism taking place around the world. The only 
suspect that the US has in custody has not yet been indicted. Given the circumstances of 
his capture and extradition, it can be argued that Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed would 
not even be in custody if not for the attacks of September 2001. The investigation into the 
bombing of the Cole saw the same sort of friction as the Khobar Towers investigation. 
The day after the bombing of the USS Cole, the former chief of counter-terrorism for the 
FBI, Bob Blitzer, said, “It is an act of war, blowing up a US ship. It is absolutely an act of 
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VIII. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the law enforcement approach for 
combating terrorism, we must first consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of 
that approach as espoused by its supporters and detractors. Having gained an 
understanding of the perceived effectiveness and potential drawbacks of the law 
enforcement approach, it will then be possible to weigh its demonstrated effectiveness, 
based on the case studies presented here, with the perceived performance to determine 
what the approach actually delivered during the period from 1988 to 2000. 
A. ADVANTAGES 
1. Democratic Traditions  
The foremost reason why the United States pursued terrorists with vigorous law 
enforcement is simple. We are a nation based on the rule of law and Americans see 
themselves as the world’s preeminent liberal democracy. The American democratic 
tradition is an idea that has not only been enshrined in US national consciousness, but 
that Americans have worked very hard to export around the world. In the Report of the 
National Commission on Terrorism (2000), the commissioners acknowledged “US 
leaders must find the appropriate balance by adopting counter-terrorism policies which 
are effective but also respect the democratic traditions which are the bedrock of 
American strength” (Countering the changing threat, 2000). DJC Carmichael noted, as far 
back as 1982, that “an effective policy requires…measures which deflate the appeal of 
terrorism …and demonstrate the superiority of established civil procedures” (Carmichael, 
1982, p. 6). To pursue terrorists without justifying these actions in an appropriate liberal 
democratic frame would be to violate America’s strongest traditions. It is also this 
dedication to principles that presents the second advantage to the legal approach. 
2. Builds Credibility 
The law enforcement approach builds credibility with other nations. The fact that 
in the pursuit of terrorists the US has proved loyal to its professed tradition, has allowed 
it to gain support among the community of nations. The law enforcement approach 
legitimizes US calls for international support when pursuing terrorists. It is this support in 
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the United Nations that gained approval of the five “Resolutions on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism” adopted between 1985 and 1997. This support also 
resulted in a vote of 15 to zero in support of Resolution 1267 “requiring the Taliban to 
turn over Osama bin Laden to a country where he will be arrested and brought to justice” 
(Fact Sheet: US Counter-terrorism Efforts”, 2000). 
3. Takes Terrorists Out of Action 
The law enforcement approach takes terrorists out of action by capturing and 
trying them and putting them in jail, where they can no longer commit crimes. As David 
Tucker noted in Combating International Terrorism, 
Not only do such proceedings take terrorists out of action, they may well 
deter others from committing terrorist acts…going after individual 
terrorists through arrest and trial may be one of the few ways that we can 
put at risk something the terrorists value, namely their freedom, if not their 
lives. (Tucker, 1999) 
This quote also alludes to another potential benefit of the law enforcement 
approach, that of deterrence. Since this study argues that deterrence needs to be the 
central piece of a counter-terrorist policy, the discussion of the law enforcement 
approach’s deterrent effect will be saved for later in this chapter. 
4. Hampers Terrorist Activity 
By publicly indicting and globally pursuing terrorists, the US reduces their 
clandestine support and severely impairs their ability to travel freely, thereby hampering 
terrorist’s ability to plan and execute terrorist attacks. This advantage is closely tied to 
building credibility with other nations. A Fact Sheet released by the State Department in 
August 1999 noted, “Since 1993, a dozen suspected international terrorist fugitives have 
been apprehended overseas and turned over to the US to stand trial” (Fact Sheet: US 
Counterterrorism Efforts, 1999). Supporters of the law enforcement approach point to 
these facts as proof that it reduces the ability of terrorists to operate against the US. 
Within the scope of this work, it must be noted that during three of the five 
investigations, Pakistan rendered valuable assistance in capturing and returning to the US 
suspects wanted by US authorities. These included Ramzi Yousef in the WTC 
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investigation, Mohammad Saddiq Odeh and two other men in the embassy bombings 
investigation, and the one unnamed suspect in the USS Cole investigation.   
5. Judicial System Does Not Stop 
Finally, the law enforcement approach maximizes the capabilities of the US 
judicial system that, once set in motion, do not stop. Once indicted, a terrorist can be 
pursued for an indefinite period of time. This provides two benefits. First, it keeps 
pressure on the terrorists. This goes back to the point made in the last paragraph about 
impairing the terrorist’s ability to operate. Second, as Tucker noted in Skirmishes at the 
Edge of Empire, “the judicial response focuses on the facts and unfolds slowly, two 
factors that diffuse emotions and encourage a reasoned response” (1997, p. 81).  
B. DISADVANTAGES 
1. Concedes the Initiative 
The most damaging aspect of the law enforcement approach is that it concedes the 
initiative to the terrorists and, in doing so, becomes reactive in nature. By criminalizing 
terrorism and responding with prosecution, the law enforcement approach requires the 
terrorist to actually commit a crime before the US can respond. This makes the US policy 
episodic by nature; only taking substantial actions in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
To be sure, the stated policy of the US government is that it will be proactive in its 
approach to combating terrorism; however, the evidence from the period covered in this 
study demonstrates conclusively that the actions taken by the US government against 
terrorism have, almost universally, been in response to a terrorist attack. It is this aspect 
of the US approach to combating terrorism that makes a study of that approach’s value 
most effective when that study examines the US responses to terrorist attacks. 
2. System is Slow to React 
The law enforcement approach to combating terrorism is too slow to react. For the 
same reason noted by David Tucker above, this approach takes time to gather facts, 
prepare a criminal case and conduct a trial. The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 occurred 
in 1988. Indictments of the two men eventually brought to trial were filed in 1991, three 
years later. The two Libyan suspects were finally handed over in April 1999, after eight 
years of diplomatic efforts to pressure Libya for extradition. The trial concluded on 
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January 31, 2001, with only one conviction. In other words, it took 12 years, using law 
enforcement, to resolve a terrorist incident that caused the deaths of 270 people. The 
other investigations studied in this work are worthy of note in this respect. The final trial 
of Ramzi Yousef concluded more than three years after the bombing of the WTC. More 
than five years after the Khobar Towers attack, there are indictments only and no 
prosecutions to date in that investigation. The trials for the five men indicted in the 
attacks on US embassies in Africa were completed three years after the attacks, with the 
remaining 17 indicted conspirators still at large. The attackers of the USS Cole have 
never been indicted, so no trial is pending. The times from attack to trial are varied and, 
in general, getting faster; however, the lag time still allows the dedicated terrorist the 
freedom to continue attacking Americans.  
3. Incomplete Resolution 
Prosecution of terrorists can lead to an incomplete resolution of the incident. One 
example of an incomplete resolution to a terrorist incident would be if the prosecution of 
the terrorists apprehended results in the de-facto exoneration of others who may be guilty 
as well. This situation is widely believed to be the case with Muammar Qadhafi in the 
Pan Am flight 103 bombing. In their Report on the Changing Threat of International 
Terrorism (2000), the commissioners acknowledge that;  
The Pan Am 103 case demonstrates the limitations of the law enforcement 
approach to achieve national security…[because] …prosecuting and 
punishing two low-level operatives for an act almost certainly directed by 
Qadhafi is a hollow victory, particularly if the trial results in his implicit 
exoneration. (Countering the changing threat, 2000) 
The example of Libya and the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 shows another type 
of potentially incomplete resolution. Since the law enforcement approach focuses on the 
individual terrorist (and most often the perpetrators of the attack), it may fall short in 
dealing with the state sponsors of terrorism. In the State Department’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism (2000), one of the four basic policy tenets for US counter-terrorism is to 
“isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism” (Patterns, 2000). PDD-39, 
President Clinton’s Policy on Counter-terrorism, reinforces this policy, stating “[the 
terrorist’s] return for prosecution …shall be a continuing central issue in bilateral 
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relations with any state that harbors or assists them (PDD-39, 1995). The fact is that there 
is really no means provided by international convention to punish countries that either 
actively or passively support terrorists. While the US might claim that it will “vigorously 
apply extraterritorial statutes to…apprehend terrorists outside of the United States” 
(PDD-39), those statutes can only be applied with the consent of the state where the 
terrorist is hiding.  
The case studies examined here demonstrate the failure of the law enforcement 
approach to address the state-sponsors of terrorism. Table 1 illustrates this problem. In 
four of the five cases there was clear state involvement; Libya in the Pan Am flight 103 
bombing, Iran in the Khobar Towers bombing, and Afghanistan in the attacks on the US 
embassies and the USS Cole. In none of the cases did the US respond to this state 
sponsorship directly. The sanctions placed on Libya for much of the 1990s were intended 
to force the turnover of the two suspects in the Pan Am flight 103 case, not to punish 
Libya for supporting the bombing. The missile attacks into Afghanistan in the aftermath 
of the embassy attacks were claimed by the Clinton Administration to be aimed at the 
terrorists themselves, not Afghanistan, and finally, the sanctions placed on Afghanistan 
by UN Resolution 1267 were to gain the surrender of Osama bin Laden only. 
 Evidence of State Sponsorship? State providing Support Punitive Action by US 
Pan Am 103 Yes Libya None 
WTC No N/A N/A 
Khobar Towers Yes Iran None 
US Embassies Yes Afghanistan None 
USS Cole Yes Afghanistan None 
Table 1.   State Sponsorship and US Response 
 
C. EVALUATING THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
1. Initial Evaluation 
In the introduction, this thesis outlined the requirements for an effective counter-
terrorist policy. They were; that a policy must either deter terrorists or, failing that, 
defend against them to stop their attacks from being effective. The effectiveness of the 
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law enforcement approach to combating terrorism can also be evaluated using law 
enforcement’s own measures of effectiveness. These are; the numbers of people indicted, 
convicted and incarcerated for committing terrorist crimes.  By either method, the law 
enforcement approach failed to effectively combat terrorism from 1988 to 2000. This 
approach did nothing to either deter or actively defend against terrorism and was not even 
effective at capturing, convicting and incarcerating terrorists who attacked the US. A 
comparison of the stated advantages of the law enforcement approach with the data from 
the five case studies shows significant inconsistencies; the disadvantages, however, 
proved largely consistent with the data gathered in the five case studies. 
2. Advantage Comparison  
The most persuasive argument used for the law enforcement approach is that it is 
harmonious with US democratic traditions and laws. The fact is that other means to 
combat terrorism available to policy makers are also in keeping with these traditions, 
despite the vocal opposition of those who feel that the law enforcement approach is the 
only way to deal with terrorists. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter guarantees the 
inherent right of self-defense to member nations. The Charter only stipulates that 
“measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council”. This language leaves many options 
available for counter-terrorist strategies, including military actions to disrupt terrorist 
organizations and efforts. Another area of much controversy is the area of preventive 
attacks against terrorists. There are many articles concerned with this debate, but again 
neither the UN Charter, nor US law denies the right of preemptive self-defense.  
The notion that using a law enforcement approach builds credibility with other 
nations is also suspect. While some support may have been gained with this approach in 
gaining ratification of international conventions, the practical applications were much 
more limited. In the cases of the Khobar Towers and USS Cole investigations, the 
resistance of the Saudi and Yemeni governments to the efforts of the FBI was a cultural 
resistance to foreigners entering their countries and demanding full cooperation to 
investigate a politically sensitive event. Simply put, the Saudi and Yemeni governments 
did not care that the US was going to great lengths to ensure a fair and impartial trial for 
any suspects, as much as they cared that dozens, even hundreds, of foreigners were inside 
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their borders, asking unpleasant questions, demanding access to places and information, 
and expecting to extradite any person found to have connections with the attacks. This 
strained the hospitality of Arab culture and offended the people of these nations in their 
own homes. The State Department also had a problem with the way the FBI conducted 
the investigation; recall the efforts of the US Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, to 
limit the numbers of investigators sent there after the bombing of the USS Cole. No 
doubt, these situations were the type envisioned by Abraham Sofaer in 1985 when he 
wrote, “In the international arena, while we have conventions, agreements and customs 
that make many terrorist acts universal crimes, international practice and doctrines 
greatly limit the enforcement of these norms” (Sofaer, 1985) 
The claim that the law enforcement approach takes terrorists out of action by 
catching and convicting them does not agree with the facts in the five case studies 
examined here. A review of the cases shows that a total of 44 people were indicted for 
these attacks. Of those 44 people, 12 were eventually convicted in criminal trials. This 
gives the law enforcement approach a 27% success rate in the five most damaging 
terrorist attacks against the US between 1988 and 2000. This means that a terrorist had 
only a one in four chance of being convicted if caught and indicted, after committing an 
attack against the US. Table 2 shows the US success rate in each of the five case studies. 
 # of people indicted # of people convicted % success rate for conviction 
Pan Am 103 2 1 50% 
WTC 6 6 100% 
Khobar Towers 14 0 0% 
US Embassies 22 5 22% 
USS Cole 0 0 0% 
Total 44 12 27% 
Table 2.   Conviction versus Indictment rates 
These facts are further substantiated by a report of the Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) of Syracuse University. The report, titled “Criminal 
Enforcement Against Terrorists” (posted November 27, 2001), covers the years 1997-
2001 and reveals some interesting information about the success of law enforcement in 
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dealing with terrorists. The report shows that, during the five-year period, a total of 385 
individuals were referred to the Justice Department for prosecution in international 
terrorist cases; of these cases the FBI referred 334, or 86.8%. The Justice Department 
declined to indict 53% of the referred cases during the same five-year period, citing “lack 
of evidence of criminal intent” and “weak or insufficient admissible evidence” most often 
as the reason for the declination of indictment.  
The data contained in this report reinforces three very important problems with 
the law enforcement approach to dealing with international terrorism. First, and definitely 
most important, assuming the FBI understands the unavoidable need for admissible 
evidence in order to indict a terrorist (as evidenced by the extensive investigations 
conducted in each of the case studies), the 42 terrorists indicted in the five case studies 
probably represent only a portion of the people found to have played a part in the attacks. 
For the rest, we can assume, the FBI was not able to gather sufficient evidence and, 
therefore, did not even bother to try to indict. Assuming for a moment that the ratio of 
people found to be involved (but without sufficient evidence to indict) to the number 
indicted is in proportion with the number of people indicted to the number convicted, 
then roughly 163 people were involved in the attacks.    
Second, and very much related to the first, since “the odds of declination for 
terrorist cases was twice as high [as all other cases]….It must be assumed that collecting 
solid evidence about a terrorist is harder than for drug, immigration and white collar 
criminals” (Criminal Enforcement Against Terrorists, 2001). The difficulty in collecting 
evidence should be readily apparent after examination of the case studies in this work. 
The numbers of agents committed to the investigations in the four attacks that occurred 
overseas, the problems encountered with the Saudi and Yemeni governments, and the 
length of time required for each are evidence of this difficulty.  
Finally, the TRAC report points out that those international terrorists who were 
actually convicted received relatively light sentences for their crimes. According to the 
report’s information on 19 people convicted in international terrorist cases between 1997 
and 2000, eleven received one year or less of prison time. However, since the remaining 
eight received very long sentences, the average sentence for a person convicted in an 
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international terrorist case was 65 months. These numbers would not have included 
Ramzi Yousef or the other men convicted in the 1993 WTC bombing as their trials were 
concluded by 1996.  
Another perceived advantage of the law enforcement approach is that by globally 
pursuing terrorists, the US reduces their clandestine support and severely impairs their 
ability to travel freely, thereby hampering terrorist’s ability to plan and execute terrorist 
attacks. Again, the information from the five case studies disputes this claim. The notion 
that US pursuit of the terrorists hampered their ability to operate is contradicted by the 
exploits of Ramzi Yousef between the bombing of the WTC and his capture, slightly less 
than two years later. In that short period of time Yousef traveled to at least four countries 
(Pakistan, Iran, Thailand and the Philippines) and planned eight terrorist operations, of 
which three were directed against the United States (the assassination of President 
Clinton, the destruction of eleven US airliners over the Pacific Ocean and flying a plane 
into CIA headquarters).  
Osama bin Laden’s ability to operate for so many years is also evidence of the 
fallacy of the concept that the law enforcement approach hampers terrorist actions. 
Although it is now widely believed that he played a part in the WTC bombing and the 
Khobar Towers attack, the first concrete evidence of his involvement in attacks on the US 
came after the 1998 attack on the US embassies in Africa. From the time of his 
involvement in that attack he eluded US efforts to capture him for three years. During 
that time he was still able to plan and execute the bombing of the USS Cole and the 
September 2001 attacks in the US. Table 3 illustrates this problem. 
 Time from Attack to Capture Actions of Terrorists During This Time 
Pan Am 10 Years House Arrest in Libya (not confirmed) 
WTC 2 Years (Ramzi Yousef) Planned 8 Attacks, Traveled to 4 Countries 
Khobar Towers 5 Years (Indictments Only) Half held in Saudi Arabia, Other Half: Actions 
Unknown 
US Embassies 1 Day to 1 Year (5 men) 
17 Others remain at large   
Planned USS Cole bombing & Sept 2001 Attacks 
USS Cole No Indictments to date Perpetrators killed in bombing, Actions of others 
unknown 
Table 3.   Timelines for Post-Attack Actions 
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 3. Building a Criminal Case 
A final problem of the law enforcement approach, noted in the analysis of the five 
cases studied here, was the simple difficulties in building a criminal case against 
international terrorists. In order to relate to the difficulties involved in building a case 
against international terrorists, imagine the prosecution of people involved in a mafia 
assassination. The two people usually sought by law enforcement are the “hit man” and 
the mafia boss who ordered the killing. It is easier, using forensic and eyewitness 
evidence, to build a case against the hit man than to build a case of conspiracy against the 
mafia boss who gave the order. The same sorts of problems confront the investigators in a 
terrorist attack. With respect to this study, the nature of this problem actually evolved 
during the period from 1988 to 2000.  
In the Pan Am flight 103 and WTC bombings, the people who were eventually 
caught and tried actually planned and carried out the attacks. The court documents 
identify Abdel Basset Ali Al-Megrahi and Ramzi Yousef as the primary planners and 
perpetrators of their respective bombing. This meant that by prosecuting these two, along 
with their accomplices, the US was, essentially, dealing with both masterminds and 
perpetrators of the attack. In the Khobar Towers and African embassies bombings, the 
perpetrators were not the masterminds, merely foot soldiers for the terrorist cause. This 
meant that while the case built against the perpetrators was relatively strong, the 
investigator’s ability to indict the masterminds, in these cases believed to be Iranian 
Intelligence operatives and Osama bin Laden respectively, was almost nothing.  
The final evolution of this process was the bombing of the USS Cole, where the 
perpetrators killed themselves in the process of carrying out the attack. In this case the 
investigators were left with no perpetrators to investigate, only people who must be 
implicated in a conspiracy role, the harder of the two cases to prove. While this is, no 
doubt, a simplified way of looking at the problem, it must be remembered that the biggest 
difference between a mafia killing and an international terrorist attack is the fact that in 
an international terrorist attack, both the attack itself and the conspirators are more than 
likely in foreign countries, where the ability of the US investigators to gather evidence 
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and arrest the terrorists is directly proportional to the amount of cooperation received by 
those countries.   
D. CONCLUSIONS 
After comparing the advantages of the law enforcement approach to combating 
terrorism with the facts of the five case studies, there can be little doubt that what the law 
enforcement approach delivers is not what it promises. Whether evaluated using the 
requirements for an effective counter-terrorist policy as outlined in this thesis, or law 
enforcement’s own measures of effectiveness, the approach used exclusively from 1988 
to 2000 did not meet the needs of the US for a policy to combat terrorism. The difficulties 
encountered during the investigation of the five terrorist attacks studied in this work as 
well as the problems associated with building a criminal case against the perpetrators and, 
especially, the masterminds of these attacks significantly reduced the probabilities of a 
successful indictment. This fact, when coupled with the low probability of capture and 
extradition to the US and the relatively short sentences given in these cases, did not 
constitute any real deterrent to the dedicated terrorist. More importantly, an approach of 
this type presents absolutely no deterrence to the terrorist, of the type seen in the attacks 
on the USS Cole and the September 2001 attacks, who is not only willing, but committed, 
to die in the execution of his mission. Furthermore, the individualistic approach of law 
enforcement completely eliminates the possibility of punishing the states that almost 
always support, either explicitly or tacitly, these terrorists.  
A comprehensive approach to combating terrorism must include measures that 
effectively deter the masterminds of these attacks, the foot soldiers who carry them out, 
and the states who help them. The effective approach must also defend against those 
terrorists who cannot be deterred by actively seeking to stop them before they complete 
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